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market, unaffected, earnings 
 
 




HOLDINGS: [1]-After petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated the statutory 
appraisal proceeding, the court found that the two most probative indications of fair value, 
pursuant to Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, were the acquired firm's unaffected thirty day average 
market price of $17.13 per share and the court's deal-price-less-synergies figure of approximately 
$18.20 per share. The deal-price-less-synergies figure was likely tainted by human error and 
incorporated an element of value derived from the merger itself; [2]-In the context of the third-
party, arm's-length merger, the unaffected market price provided the most persuasive evidence of 
fair value. Petitioners' evidence provided no basis to question the integrity of the acquired firm's 
pre-announcement market price as an indicator of fair value; [3]-The court did not rely on the 








§ 1.5 LexisNexis® Headnotes 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN1   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
When evaluating the reliability of the deal price, a trial judge must remember that the purpose of 
an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable value that might 
have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it is to make sure 
that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve 
to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's length transaction. Put 
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differently, the issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible 
bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN2   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Discounted cash flow models should be used in appraisal proceedings when the respondent 
company was not public or was not sold in an open market check. When market evidence is 
available, the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that always come 
when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on widely 
divergent partisan expert testimony. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Meetings & Voting > Special Meetings > Fundamental 
Changes 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Mergers > Duties & Liabilities of Shareholders 
HN3   Special Meetings, Fundamental Changes 
Under Delaware law, unless a corporation's constitutive documents impose a higher voting 
requirement, a merger requires the approval of a majority of the voting power represented by the 
corporation's outstanding shares. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Remedies 
HN4   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Remedies 
Delaware's appraisal statute allows stockholders who perfect their appraisal rights to receive fair 
value for their shares as of the merger date instead of the merger consideration. More like this 
Headnote 





• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Remedies 
HN5   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The trial court's ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the fair or intrinsic value 
of each share on the closing date of the merger. To accomplish this task, the court should first 
envisage the entire pre-merger company as a going concern, as a standalone entity, and assess its 
value as such. Because the court strives to value the corporation itself as distinguished from a 
specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a particular shareholder, the court 
should not apply a minority discount when there is a controlling stockholder. The court should 
exclude any synergies or other value expected from the merger giving rise to the appraisal 
proceeding. Once the total standalone value is determined, the court awards each petitioning 
stockholder his pro rata portion of this total plus interest. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN6   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
When seeking to prove fair value, parties may introduce proof of value by any techniques or 
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and otherwise 
admissible in court. The appraisal statute assigns the Court of Chancery the duty to consider the 
relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties and then determine which method (and 
inputs), or combination of methods, yields the most reliable determination of value. But, 
whatever route it chooses, the trial court must justify its methodology (or methodologies) 
according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial principles. Although the Court 
of Chancery has broad discretion to make findings of fact, those findings of fact have to be 
grounded in the record and reliable principles of corporate finance and economics. More like 
this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN7   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
In the context of an appraisal proceeding, if a company's shares trade in a market having 
attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying a traditional version of the semi-strong 
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form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, then the unaffected trading price provides 
evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the company as a going concern. That 
evidence is more reliable than the single estimate of any one individual, be he a knowledgeable 
market participant, corporate insider, valuation professional, or trial judge. More like this 
Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > Corporations > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & 
Dissent Rights 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Directors & Officers > Management Duties & 
Liabilities > Fiduciary Duties 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Management Duties & Liabilities > Causes of 
Action > Fraud & Misrepresentation 
HN8   Shareholder Actions, Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights 
Whether management causes an informational distortion is pertinent not only for a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim or fraud action, but for an appraisal proceeding as well. More like this 
Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
• Mergers & Acquisitions Law > Sales of Assets 
HN9   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
When a widely held, publicly traded company has been sold in an arm's-length transaction, the 
deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Evidence > ... > Procedural Matters > Preliminary Questions > Admissibility of Evidence 
• Evidence > ... > Statements as Evidence > Hearsay > Rule Components 
• Evidence > ... > Exceptions > Business Records > Normal Course of Business 
HN10   Preliminary Questions, Admissibility of Evidence 
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
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hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Del. R. Evid. 801(c). 
Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by the Delaware Uniform Rules of 
Evidence. Del. R. Evid. 802. Del. R. Evid. 803(6) recognizes an exception for documents made 
at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in 
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 
business activity to make the document, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness unless the source of information or the method or circumstances of preparation 
indicate lack of trustworthiness. The business records exception to the hearsay rule permits the 
admission of hearsay documents that are likely to be trustworthy because a business regularly 
maintains and relies on them. The principal precondition to admission of documents as a 
business record is that the records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered 
reliable. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN11   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
In a scenario where the underlying market price is reliable, competition and negotiation become 
secondary. Under those circumstances, an arm's-length deal at a premium over the market price 
is nonexploitive. By definition, it gives stockholders what would fairly be given to them in an 
arm's-length transaction. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN12   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
To derive an estimate of fair value, the court must exclude any synergies or other value expected 
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding itself. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN13   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The discounted cash flow methodology is a valuation technique that the financial community 
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generally accepts and that Court of Chancery frequently uses in appraisal proceedings. While the 
particular assumptions underlying its application may always be challenged in any particular 
case, the validity of the discounted cash flow technique qua valuation methodology is no longer 
open to question. It is a standard method that gives life to the finance principle that firms should 
be valued based on the expected value of their future cash flows, discounted to present value in a 
manner that accounts for risk. The discounted cash flow model entails three basic components: 
an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will generate and when, over some period; a 
terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of the end of the projection period, of the 
firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and finally a cost of capital with which to 
discount to a present value both the projected net cash flows and the estimated terminal or 
residual value. Although widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no 
credible market information and no market check, discounted cash flow valuations involve many 
inputs—all subject to disagreement by well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and 
even slight differences in these inputs can produce large valuation gaps. More like this 
Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN14   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Under Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262, the court must make a point estimate of fair value measured 
in dollars and cents. When determining fair value, the Court of Chancery must exercise its 
considerable discretion while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and 
corporate finance principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN15   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a 
single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the collective 
judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given company and 
the value of its shares. In many circumstances a property interest is best valued by the amount a 
buyer will pay for it and a well-informed, liquid trading market will provide a measure of fair 
value superior to any estimate the court could impose. More like this Headnote 





• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN16   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
The time for determining the value of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger 
transaction on the date of the merger. If the value of the corporation changes between the signing 
of the merger and the closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the operative 
reality of the corporation at the effective time of the merger. More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN17   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
When an acquirer purchases a widely traded firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay 
for the entire firm anticipates incremental value both from synergies and from the reduced 
agency costs that result from unitary (or controlling) ownership. Like synergies, the value 
created by reduced agency costs results from the transaction and is not part of the going concern 
value of the firm. The value belongs to the buyer, although the seller may extract a portion of it 
through negotiations. Eliminating shared synergies therefore only goes part of the way towards 
eliminating any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger. 
A court also must eliminate the share of value that accrues from the reduced agency costs. 
More like this Headnote 
Shepardize - Narrow by this Headnote 
 
 
• Business & Corporate Law > ... > Shareholder Actions > Appraisal Actions & Dissent 
Rights > Fair Market Value 
HN18   Appraisal Actions & Dissent Rights, Fair Market Value 
When none of the parties establishes a value that is persuasive, the Court of Chancery must make 
a determination based on its own analysis. The appraisal statute requires that the court shall 
determine the fair value of the shares, Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 262(h). This means that the 
chancellor must reach his own, independent determination of fair value. More like this 
Headnote 
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In May 2015, Hewlett-Packard Company ("HP") acquired Aruba Networks, Inc. ("Aruba" or the 
"Company"). The transaction was governed by an Agreement and Plan of Merger by and among 
Aruba, HP, and Aspen Acquisition Sub., Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of HP. Under the 
merger agreement, each share of Aruba common stock was converted into the right to receive 
consideration of $24.67 per share, subject to the holder's statutory right to eschew the merger 
consideration and seek appraisal.1  The petitioners perfected their appraisal rights and litigated 
this statutory appraisal proceeding. This is the court's post-trial decision on the issue of fair 
value. 
The Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell2  and DFC3  endorse using the market price 
of a widely [*2]  traded firm as evidence of fair value.4  As in Dell and DFC, the market for 
Aruba's shares exhibited attributes associated with the premises underlying the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis. Under Dell and DFC, these attributes provide sufficient evidence of market 
efficiency to make Aruba's stock price "a possible proxy for fair value."5  Aruba's thirty-day 
average unaffected market price was $17.13 per share. 
The Delaware Supreme Court's decisions in Dell and DFC endorse using the deal price in a 
third-party, arm's-length transaction as evidence of fair value.6  HN1  When evaluating the 
reliability of the deal price, a trial judge must remember that 
the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable 
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it 
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is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects 
what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm'slength 
transaction.7  
Put differently, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest 
possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is [*3]  whether the dissenters got fair value and were not 
exploited."8  
In this case, the merger was an arm's-length transaction that provided stockholders with 
consideration of $24.67 per share. By definition, it provided stockholders with "fair 
compensation" in the sense of "what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length 
transaction."9  The petitioners proved that the Company's negotiators might have done better, 
but there is no reason to believe that they left any of Aruba's fundamental value on the 
bargaining table. When the merger consideration of $24.67 per share is compared to the 
unaffected market price of $17.13 per share, it is not possible to say that Aruba's stockholders 
were exploited. The deal price therefore provides reliable evidence of fair value. 
The Dell and DFC decisions recognize that a deal price may include synergies, and they endorse 
deriving an indication of fair value by deducting synergies from the deal price.10  The 
respondent's expert cited a study that provides data on the base rates at which targets successfully 
extract a share of anticipated synergies from acquirers. Using that data, this decision arrives at a 
midpoint valuation indication for Aruba of $18.20 [*4]  per share. I personally believe that 
Aruba's negotiators did not extract as great a share of the synergies as they might have, which 
suggests that deal-price-less-synergies figure is slightly higher. 
The Dell and DFC decisions caution against relying on discounted cash flow analyses prepared 
by adversarial experts when reliable market indicators are available.11  The decisions teach that 
HN2  discounted cash flow models should be "used in appraisal proceedings when the 
respondent company was not public or was not sold in an open market check."12  When market 
evidence is available, "the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that 
always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on 
widely divergent partisan expert testimony."13  In this case, the discounted cash flow analysis 
prepared by the petitioners' expert generated a value of $32.57, which was inconsistent with the 
market evidence. The discounted cash flow analysis prepared by the respondent's expert 
generated a value of $19.75, nestled nicely between the unaffected market price and the deal 
price. Its methodological underpinnings, however, provided cause for concern, as did 
the [*5]  meandering route by which the expert arrived at his final figure. I do not rely on the 
discounted cash flow valuations. 
The two most probative indications of fair value are Aruba's unaffected market price of $17.13 
per share and my deal-price-less-synergies figure of approximately $18.20 per share. In the 
context of this case, the unaffected market price provides the most persuasive evidence of fair 
value. My deal-price-less-synergies figure suffers from two major shortcomings. 
First, my deal-price-less-synergies figure is likely tainted by human error.14  Estimating 
synergies requires exercises of human judgment analogous to those involved in crafting a 
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discounted cash flow valuation. The Delaware Supreme Court's preference for market indications 
over discounted cash flow valuations counsels in favor of preferring market indications over the 
similarly judgment-laden exercise of backing out synergies.15  
Second, my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an element of value derived 
from the merger itself: the value that the acquirer creates by reducing agency costs.16  A buyer's 
willingness to pay a premium over the market price of a widely held firm reflects [*6]  not only 
the value of anticipated synergies but also the value created by reducing agency costs.17  The 
petitioners are not entitled to share in either element of value, because complex matters and 
could be wrong. More broadly, the baseline data about the manner in which buyers and sellers 
allocate synergies could reflect sampling or measurement errors. both "aris[e] from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger."18  The synergy deduction compensates for the 
one element of value arising from the merger, but a further downward adjustment would be 
necessary to address the other.19  
Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware law has embraced a traditional formulation of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market price provides a direct route to the 
same endpoint, at least for [*7]  a company that is widely traded and lacks a controlling 
stockholder.20  Adjusting down from the deal price reaches, indirectly, the result that the market 
price already provides. Aruba's unaffected market price provides the most persuasive evidence of 
fair value. 
By awarding fair value based on the unaffected market price, this decision is not interpreting 
Dell and DFC to hold that market price is now the standard for fair value. Rather, Aruba's 
unaffected market price provides the best evidence of its going concern value.21  The fair value 
of Aruba is $17.13 per share. 
 
 
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
The parties reached agreement on 180 stipulations of fact in the Pre-Trial Order. Trial took place 
over three days. The parties submitted 996 exhibits, including eleven deposition transcripts. 
Three fact witnesses and three experts testified live. The parties proved the following facts by a 




Aruba was a Delaware corporation headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. Aruba went public in 
2007. Until its acquisition by HP, Aruba's common stock traded on the NASDAQ under the 
symbol "ARUN."22  
Aruba principally sold components for enterprise [*8]  wireless local area networks 
("WLANs").23  From 2008 until 2014, its market share increased from 8.6% to 12.8%. Shortly 
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before the merger, Aruba's market share peaked at 14%.24  Although Aruba was a significant 
player in the industry, Cisco Systems, Inc. dominated it.25  For those same years, Cisco's 
market share hovered around 50%.26  
During the years leading up to the merger, Dominic Orr served as Aruba's CEO.27  Before 
joining Aruba, Orr already had enjoyed a successful career in the technology and 
telecommunications sectors.28  In 2002, in his early fifties, Orr retired to pursue a range of 
personal interests.29  
In 2006, the Aruba board of directors (the "Board") lured Orr out of retirement. Orr anticipated 
serving for three years. But when his first term ended in 2009, the Board had not identified a 
successor. Orr agreed to stay on for a second three-year term, but when that term ended, the 
Board still had not identified a successor. At that point, Orr agreed to stay on "year by year," on 
the condition that Aruba seriously engage in succession planning.30  The Board agreed but did 
not move rapidly. The Board did not engage an executive search firm until 2014. Even then, the 
Board [*9]  limited the engagement to developing a position specification for a "CEO succession 
review."31  Active recruitment would require a separate engagement.32  There remained "[n]o 
firm date" for Orr's retirement.33  
By the time he led the merger negotiations with HP in late 2014 and early 2015, Orr was ready to 
return to an active retirement.34  As a responsible and conscientious individual, he was not 
about to leave Aruba in the lurch, and he cared deeply about the Company and its employees.35  
But he also had other things that he wanted to do with his life. The sale of Aruba to HP gave Orr 
a path to an honorable personal and professional exit. 
 
 
B. Wall Street Analysts Question Aruba's Financial Performance. 
One of the precipitating events for the merger talks between HP and Aruba was a negative stock 
market reaction to Aruba's results for the third quarter of 2014.36  In May 2014, Aruba 
announced its quarterly results. Revenue exceeded both Aruba's own guidance and the Wall 
Street consensus estimates.37  But the Company reported a gross margin of 70.5%, below the 
consensus estimate of 72% and Aruba's "longstanding target of 71-73%."38  
The resulting analyst coverage [*10]  was harsh. Wall Street firms headlined their reports with 
titles like "Weak Gross Margins Outweigh Sales Upside; Maintain Market Perform" and 
"FY3Q14: Disappointing Gross Margin Offsets Ongoing 802.11ac Ramp."39  Aruba's stock 
price dropped 12.11% on the news, from $20.06 to $17.63.40  
Internally, Aruba management was disappointed.41  They had not anticipated the furor over 
gross margins.42  Orr vented to the Board: "[W]e, as an executive team, are finally sick of wall 
st discrediting our tremendous come back in revenue growth because they said we are not as 
profitable as Ubiquiti (give me a break!)."43  
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To improve margins, Aruba management developed a cost optimization plan called "Project 
Greyhound."44  It contemplated eliminating approximately 130 employees and relocating 
another eighty to "lower-cost geographies."45  Management undertook the project because the 
"Company value [was] not adequately reflected in [the] stock price."46  
In August 2014, Aruba announced its results for the full year of 2014, including quarterly results 
for the fourth quarter. Aruba achieved record revenue. Orr told investors that Aruba had achieved 
"significant market share gains" and had a [*11]  "strong platform for future growth."47  Aruba 
simultaneously announced the implementation of Project Greyhound.48  
The analysts' reactions were mixed. Some were positive.49  Others were more cautious.50  
Traders bid up Aruba's stock price by 8%, from $20.24 to $22.01.51  
 
 
C. HP Approaches Aruba. 
HP had been monitoring Aruba as an acquisition candidate. HP felt it had strong offerings in the 
wired networking space and wanted to combine those products with Aruba's wireless offerings. 
HP believed the combined product set could compete effectively with Cisco and take significant 
market share.52  
On August 27, 2014, the day after Aruba announced its full-year earnings, HP approached Aruba 
about a deal. Antonio Neri, a Senior Vice President at HP, contacted Orr.53  Orr promptly 
notified Daniel Warmenhoven, Aruba's lead independent director.54  Warmenhoven, in turn, 
contacted Frank Quattrone, a senior investment banker at Qatalyst Partners LP.55  
The next day, Warmenhoven notified the full Aruba Board of HP's interest. He also reported that 
he had contacted Quattrone and that Orr would contact Stuart Francis, an investment banker who 
had recently left Barclays Capital Inc. to join [*12]  Evercore Group L.L.C.56  Warmenhoven 
told the other directors that HP wanted to proceed "quickly and present the proposal to the [HP] 
board on Sept[ember] 16."57  
Qatalyst jumped at the potential engagement. Immediately after hearing from Warmenhoven, 
Quattrone reached out to Orr and sent him a proposed engagement letter.58  Two days later, 
George Boutros, another senior banker with Qatalyst, sent Orr a "[s]cript for [d]iscussion with 
H[P]."59  Meanwhile, Warmenhoven reconsidered reaching out to Francis. Warmhoven "had no 
experience with Evercore" and "didn't know the team."60  
On August 29, 2014, Neri again spoke with Orr. Neri insisted that HP was serious. Orr tried to 
"delicately set expectations that this is going to be a high premium deal."61  
On September 1, 2014, Neri and Orr met in person. A talking point that Boutros prepared for the 
meeting stressed the importance of price: "[T]here will have to be a very substantial premium to 
market, well in excess of the typical m&a premium, in order to fully reflect both the substantial 
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upside potential we have as an independent company, and our strategic value to you and 
others."62  
On September 2, 2014, Warmenhoven spoke with HP's CEO, Meg [*13]  Whitman. She 
confirmed HP's interest.63  Later that day, the Aruba Board met. Orr described the 
developments with HP and reported that HP had not yet proposed "any financial terms or other 
parameters regarding a possible strategic transaction."64  
During the meeting, members of the Board expressed concern about having Qatalyst advise the 
Company in discussions with HP. Qatalyst had represented Autonomy Corporation PLC when 
HP bought it for $11 billion in 2011.65  The deal was widely understood to have been a 
"disaster"66  for HP that resulted in an $8.8 billion write-down and protracted litigation.67  
HP's acquisition of Aruba would be its first significant deal since Autonomy. The directors 
wondered if HP would balk at working across from Qatalyst.68  
When Warmenhoven raised these concerns with Quattrone and Boutros, they reassured him that 
(i) Qatalyst had worked off of Autonomy's audited financials and was as much a victim as 
anyone else, (ii) HP understood this, (iii) the entire HP M&A team had turned over since 
Autonomy, and (iv) Qatalyst had a good relationship with the new team. The Aruba Board 
accepted these reassurances.69  
With the Autonomy concerns allayed, Qatalyst and Aruba [*14]  negotiated the terms of 
Qatalyst's engagement letter. Qatalyst projected that a deal price "around $30" per share was "the 
most likely outcome" and proposed a fee equal to 1.25% of the transaction value for a deal at $30 
per share or higher.70  Qatalyst proposed a richer fee of 1.5% for a price at $36 or higher. 
Qatalyst felt that a price below $30 warranted 1% of deal value.71  
Aruba's CFO, Mike Galvin, pushed back. He pointed out that "it's universally thought that 
[Aruba] is undervalued right now" and, therefore, a price at the higher end of the range was a 
strong possibility.72  Orr agreed with Galvin's assessment. He stressed that the "board doesn't 
want [a] deal below $30; I want it above $33."73  He further advised that he was "not comfy 
[with] a ramp from 30 to 33," because "[i]t would not be spicy enough" to incentivize Qatalyst 
"to focus on the 33-35 target range we want."74  After heated negotiations, the final engagement 
letter provided for a flat 1% fee.75  
 
 
D. The Discussions With HP Move Forward. 
Orr and Neri met again on September 10, 2014. Orr emphasized Aruba's strong results, its 
willingness to remain independent, and the synergies that a deal would produce.76  
Internal [*15]  HP analyses confirmed the potential for substantial synergies.77  
On September 15, 2014, HP kicked off its due diligence. From that point on, management 
representatives at various levels met on a series of occasions.78  The speed and intrusiveness of 
HP's diligence surprised Orr.79  In a discussion with Neri on September 18, Orr stressed that for 
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a transaction to occur, HP would "have to pay a very compelling price that reflects both the 
significant upside potential that we have ahead of us, and the strategic value of Aruba . . . . This 
means that this deal will not happen at a conventional M&A premium."80  
 
 
E. No Other Strategic Buyers Show Interest. 
On September 25, 2014, the Aruba Board authorized Qatalyst to contact other potential buyers to 
gauge their interest. Qatalyst developed a preliminary list.81  The Board instructed Qatalyst to 
focus on "a limited number of third parties with financial wherewithal and a strategic interest in 
mobile technology" that would enjoy "compelling synergies" so that the buyer could be 
"competitive with any potential proposal from [HP]."82  The Board instructed Qatalyst not to 
contact any private equity firms, believing that "given the Company's volatile [*16]  revenues 
and unpredictable cash flows and the potential for synergies between Aruba's business with a 
strategic acquiror, private equity firms would not be competitive in their potential valuations."83
 
Qatalyst identified thirteen "Selected Potential Partners."84  Between September 29 and October 
4, 2014, Qatalyst approached five of them.85  By October 9, each had declined.86  Boutros 
explained that "[i]t was very clear that none of them had any interest in an acquisition" and that it 
had "nothing to do with price."87  Orr concluded that "[n]ow our only (but strong) weapon is to 
say we go alone."88  Boutros was "not at all troubled by that," observing that it was "what we 
expected anyway."89  
 
 
F. The Parties' Initial Valuations 
In early October 2014, Aruba provided HP with a set of internal projections based on figures 
from Aruba's revised three-year strategic financial plan, which Aruba had prepared in the 
ordinary course of business in June (the "June Plan").90  In August, Galvin and his finance team 
had updated the June Plan to incorporate the effects of Project Greyhound and to make the plan 
more conservative. They had reduced the anticipated revenue growth rate for 2016 and 
2017 [*17]  and adopted more conservative assumptions for bookings, gross margin, and 
operating margin.91  In September, the Aruba team reviewed the numbers with Qatalyst, 
describing the plan as a "medium" case that was "more moderate" than the June Plan.92  By 
early October, the Aruba team and Qatalyst had created a more bullish set of projections that 
forecasted revenue consistent with the June Plan (the "October Projections").93  Using the 
October Projections and a discounted cash flow methodology, Qatalyst derived a valuation range 
for Aruba of $23.50 to $31.08 per share.94  
HP's internal deal team used the October Projections to prepare a discounted cash flow valuation 
of its own. HP estimated Aruba's value as a standalone company at $18.76 per share.95  But HP 
also estimated that a transaction between Aruba and HP would generate $1.4 billion in revenue 
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synergies and another $300 million in cost synergies.96  With synergies, the team estimated that 
the pro forma value of Aruba could be as high as $32.05 per share.97  
 
 
G. HP Begins Recruiting Orr. 
While the HP deal team was internally developing its pricing parameters, the senior members of 
the team continued their discussions with [*18]  Orr. Neri and Orr had a "pretty open dialogue," 
and Orr "remain[ed] positive about [HP's] approach."98  Neri understood from Orr that Aruba 
was "not running a sales process," and Orr made no effort to "postur[e] about trying to pin [HP] 
against someone else."99  
In early November 2014, HP's Global Head of Corporate Development, Joakim Johansson, met 
with Orr. In an email to Qatalyst and other Aruba executives, Orr recounted that Johansson let 
him "know clearly that, post combination, they expect me to run the whole networking 
business."100  Orr said that Johansson wanted "to look me in the eye and see that I have no 
objection. I told him I have no objection."101  
HP's solicitation of Orr violated the terms of a confidentiality agreement that HP had entered into 
with Aruba on October 2, 2014. That agreement contained a non-solicit provision, which stated: 
HP hereby agrees that, except to the extent expressly authorized by the board of directors of the 
Company (or any authorized committee thereof) in advance, neither HP nor any of its 
Representatives acting on its behalf will directly or indirectly have any formal or informal 
discussions, or directly or indirectly enter into any agreement, [*19]  arrangement or 
understanding (whether or not binding), with any director, officer or other employee of the 
Company relating to (i) any retention, severance or other compensation, incentives or benefits 
that may be or become payable to any directors, officers or employees of the Company in 
connection with the Transaction or following the consummation thereof, or (ii) any directorship, 
employment, consulting arrangement or other similar association or involvement of any 
directors, officers or other employees of the Company with HP or any of its businesses or 
operations following the consummation of a Transaction.102  
The Aruba Board had not authorized HP's solicitation of Orr.103  
 
 
H. The HP Board Balks. 
On November 6, 2014, the HP deal team asked Whitman to approve paying up to $3 billion for 
Aruba, or $26.66 per share.104  In its presentation to Whitman, the deal team scaled back the 
synergies slightly, with revenue synergies of $1.26 billion and cost synergies of $295 million.105
 The pro forma, with-synergies discounted cash flow value of Aruba declined to $31.17 per 
share.106  Whitman backed the acquisition; the next step was to obtain authority from HP's 
board of directors (the "HP Board").107  
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On November 20, 2014, Aruba announced its earnings for the first quarter of 2015. Management 
described an "outstanding quarter" that included "[r]ecord revenues" that exceeded "the top end 
of [their] guidance range."108  Management also reported that Project Greyhound had improved 
margins, "with non-GAAP operating margin growing to 21.8%."109  But Aruba also announced 
a range of revenue guidance for the second quarter of 2015 that was 1% lower at the midpoint 
than the pre-announcement analyst consensus.110  Analysts fixated on the lowered guidance. 
Although Aruba management explained that they were trying to be prudent,111  Aruba's stock 
dropped by 14%, closing at $18.82.112  
The HP deal team saw the price drop as an opportunity to buy Aruba at a discount.113  
Internally, HP acknowledged that Aruba's results were "better than we expected,"114  that they 
validated the case that the deal team had presented to the HP Board,115  and that "[t]he softer 
guidance did not cause us to change our financial model."116  
The HP Board, however, remained skittish after the Autonomy fiasco, and it was not ready to 
authorize a bid. Neri told Orr that the HP Board had questions about the deal and that it would 
take another [*21]  two or three weeks to answer them.117  
Orr felt the process had dragged on long enough, and he recommended that the Aruba Board 
terminate discussions.118  With the Aruba Board's backing, management conveyed that Aruba 
was moving on.119  Aruba formally terminated discussions on November 25.120  
 
 
I. HP Engages Advisors And Continues Analyzing The Deal. 
After Aruba terminated discussions, HP continued working on the deal. In late November 2014, 
HP engaged McKinsey & Company to validate its business case for the acquisition. McKinsey 
concluded that HP could expect market share gains and revenue and cost synergies that were in 
line with HP management's estimates.121  
In December 2014, HP engaged Barclays as its financial advisor.122  At the time, Barclays had 
an existing relationship with Aruba, having worked with Aruba on a potential convertible debt 
financing since June 2013.123  The debt financing had been ready to launch in September 2014, 
but Aruba declined to move forward. The lead banker at Barclays inferred that Aruba was 
considering a major M&A transaction.124  Barclays spent the next three months trying to get a 
role representing Aruba, until they secured the engagement for HP.125  Barclays also 
was [*22]  one of two banks executing Aruba's ongoing share repurchase program, which had 
been in place since June 2012.126  In February 2014, the Aruba Board had authorized 
management to repurchase up to $500 million of Aruba's common stock in the open market at 
prices up to $25 per share.127  When approving the repurchases, the Board made the following 
determination: "The recent trading price of the Company's stock on the NASDAQ Global Select 
Market has been depressed and the Board believes that the trading price of the Company's 
common stock may be undervalued . . . ."128  Aruba management suspended the repurchases in 
October 2014 because of the discussions with HP.129  After terminating discussions with HP in 
November 2014, Orr recommended resuming the repurchase program and buying shares worth 
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up to $75 million, because "the stock is underperforming."130  Aruba resumed its repurchases at 
up to $25 per share, believing its shares to be undervalued below that figure.131  
Using consensus analyst estimates for Aruba's standalone performance, Barclays provided HP 
with a range of discounted cash flow values for Aruba as a standalone company and compared 
them with pro [*23]  forma values for Aruba that incorporated synergies.132  
Discount Rate Perpetuity Growth Rate 
  2% 3% 4% 
  Street Synergy Street Synergy Street Synergy 
11% 19.31 $29.49 $20.86 $32.29 $22.85 $35.89 
12% 17.61 $26.45 $18.80 $28.62 $20.30 $31.32 
13% 16.21 $23.98 $17.16 $25.69 $18.32 $27.78 
Barclay's valuation work confirmed the HP deal team's internal estimates. 
 
 
J. HP Approaches Aruba Again. 
Meanwhile, Aruba's stock price remained stuck around $18-19 per share, and analysts continued 
to criticize the Company. Orr felt that the analysts had soured on Aruba and were complaining 
about everything.133  Galvin expressed frustration that analysts seemed unwilling to 
"acknowledge the 6 very strong [quarters] in a row we've had."134  One analyst suggested to 
Aruba management that the stock price was low enough to justify an accelerated buyback, 
observing that if management did not pursue that option, an activist might.135  A group of 
investors met with management and privately criticized the Company's performance.136  
Against this backdrop, in late December 2014, Whitman and Neri invited Orr to dinner.137  The 
meeting took place on January 21, 2015. Whitman told Orr that HP still wanted to acquire 
Aruba.138  Orr responded positively and suggested that [*24]  they try to sign up a deal by early 
March. He told Whitman that Aruba had "over 2000 customers and partners coming to 
Atmosphere 2015 in Vegas the week of March 1-5," and "[i]t would be silly not to announce it 
there."139  Whitman "completely agreed," observing "that, in her experience, mergers need 
forcing function and let this be the one."140  
Whitman also told Orr that HP would not work with Qatalyst under any circumstances. That 
same night, Orr told Warmenhoven that "Meg [Whitman] spoke with conviction and emotion 
over dinner that they [Qatalyst] were guilty. Qatalyst will argue the reverse, but it does not 
matter."141  Orr concluded that "if we don't insert [a] buffer person, our negotiation will suffer 
severely."142  To resolve the problem, Warmenhoven doubled back to the solution he had 
previously dismissed: using Francis. Warmenhoven reminded Orr that Francis "is in a new firm 
and not conflicted, and Meg [Whitman] knows and (I think) trusts him."143  He offered to call 
Whitman to see if involving Francis would be acceptable.144  
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On January 23, 2015, Warmenhoven updated the Aruba Board. He reported that Aruba should 
receive a formal offer letter soon. He explained [*25]  that "[w]e do have a bit of an issue and 
that is our choice of advisors. [HP] is very anti [Qatalyst]."145  He reminded the Board that the 
Company already had a signed engagement letter with Qatalyst, so Aruba would have to pay 
Qatalyst regardless, but he suggested hiring Francis to handle the negotiations. Warmenhoven 
pointed out that "Evercore is new in the tech sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4% 
just to get a deal done that they can brag about publicly."146  
Warmenhoven spoke with Whitman that same day. She told him that "Qatalyst, Frank 
[Quattrone] & George [Boutros] are not welcome in the negotiations. The issue is bigger than 
Autonomy and goes back to EBay & Yahoo."147  Whitman described Boutros as "evil."148  
But Whitman said that she would happily negotiate with either Francis or Warmenhoven, as long 
as Qatalyst stayed "in the back room."149  She also wanted Qatalyst "squeezed a bit" on their 
fees.150  
Aruba retained Evercore that day. Francis reported to his partners that the "[d]eal timing is to try 
to sign a merger agreement and announce by mid February."151  His partners were thrilled. One 
replied: "Truly amazing! This is a franchise transaction! Well [*26]  done!"152  Another 
responded: "This is franchise defining. Well done, and it shows the power of loyalty, which you 
have always eschewed! [sic]"153  A third offered: "Just remarkable, Stu[.] What a coup! Would 
be, as you say, a dynamic advance for Evercore in The Valley."154  
 
 
K. Qatalyst Tries To Repair Its Relationship With HP. 
Qatalyst was as crushed by the news as Evercore was elated. When Orr told Boutros, he was "so 
emotional, defensive AND offensive (to Meg [Whitman]) that he hardly let me talk."155  
Quattrone asked Warmenhoven to intervene with Whitman on his behalf, and Warmenhoven 
asked Whitman to meet personally with Quattrone.156  Quattrone then sent Whitman an email 
of his own: 
I was very surprised and disappointed to learn from Dan Warmenhoven today that you recently 
expressed very strong negative feelings about our firm, some of our people (including me) and 
our current representation of Aruba. I would greatly appreciate the opportunity to speak or meet 
with you at your earliest convenience to understand from you directly what your concerns are 
and give me the opportunity to address them. . . . [W]hile our loyalties are always to our client on 
any assignment, I am confident we can address [*27]  your concerns, play a constructive role and 
engage with your team in a professional manner.157  
When Whitman did not respond, Warmenhoven followed up the next day, vouched for Qattrone, 
and expressed confidence that "if you two could 'clear the air' [then] Frank [Quattrone] and 
[Qatalyst] could be constructive participants in getting this deal done."158  
In an email to Aruba management, Warmenhoven explained why the dispute with Whitman was 
so important to Quattrone: 
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The issue is not Aruba. It is about the [Qatalyst] brand . . . . If word spreads that they were tossed 
from this deal because HP will not engage with them on any M&A transaction, that creates a big 
issue for them. . . . Frank [Quattrone] wants to save his firm . . . . The relationship, or lack 
thereof, between [Qatalyst] and HP / Meg [Whitman] is now their focus.159  
Orr wondered "how much time we allow" before saying "sorry, [Qatalyst]. We need to protect 
our transaction. [W]e cannot worry about your brand!"160  
Whitman finally spoke with Quattrone on January 29, 2015.161  She repeated the concerns she 
had relayed to Warmenhoven and again emphasized that "we cannot have [Qatalyst] as the 
primary representation for Aruba [*28]  interacting with us and with our board."162  On 




L. HP's Initial Proposal 
By the time Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr at the end of January 2015, HP had worked 
with Barclays to analyze a range of prices from $23 to $26.50 per share. Based on this analysis, 
HP anticipated making an "opening bid" of $24.00 and received board approval to go up to 
$25.00.164  After the dinner and Orr's enthusiastic response, HP revised its strategy. On January 
31, Johansson called Orr to notify him that HP was preparing a written offer.165  Orr remained 
eager. He suggested accelerating the timeline and "getting a deal announced by [Aruba's] 
earnings on Feb 26."166  He offered that to achieve that timeline, Aruba "would respond as 
early as Monday/Tuesday of this week."167  
Later that day, HP sent Aruba a written indication of interest for a cash transaction at $23.25 per 
share, for an aggregate valuation of $2.563 billion.168  The price per share represented a 40.2% 
premium to Aruba's closing price on the previous day and a 35.1% premium to the stock's thirty-
day average price.169  The price exceeded Barclays' latest stand-alone [*29]  discounted cash 
flow valuations of Aruba based on analyst estimates, which ranged from $17.47 to $22.61 per 
share.170  The price was seventy-five cents below the opening bid of $24.00 per share that HP 
had been considering at the beginning of the month. The offer was $3.80 per share below the low 
end of Barclays' most recent pro forma discounted cash flow valuations that included synergies, 
which valued Aruba at between $27.05 and $37.61 per share.171  
 
 
M. Aruba Responds. 
The Aruba Board initially met to consider HP's proposal on January 31, 2015. The directors 
decided to defer any detailed consideration of the proposal until after management presented 
revised projections and Evercore and Qatalyst had an opportunity to analyze them.172  
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On February 2, 2015, the Aruba Board met again. Management presented an updated version of 
the October Projections, prepared in the ordinary course of business, that reflected the 
Company's performance to date (the "February Projections").173  Qatalyst reported that they 
had spoken with a sixth potential strategic partner who also was not interested in acquiring 
Aruba.174  
While the Aruba Board was meeting, a new analyst report criticized the Company, and the stock 
price [*30]  fell.175  Aruba's General Counsel forwarded the report to Evercore and Qatalyst, 
telling them that they should inform HP that "today's stock price does not reflect reality."176  
She noted that Aruba was going to beat its guidance for the quarter, but that "no one knows that 
yet."177  Francis was similarly concerned that the negative analyst reports had depressed the 
stock price and created a buying opportunity for HP.178  But he also worried that HP would 
disengage if Aruba waited to release its quarterly results first and then negotiated from a place of 
strength; to get a deal done, it was "now or never."179  
On February 4, 2015, the Aruba Board met again and received a presentation from Evercore on 
valuation.180  Using the February Projections, Evercore generated the following discounted 
cash flow valuation range for Aruba on a standalone basis: 
 
 
Perpetuity Growth Rate 
WACC 4.0% 4.3% 4.5% 4.8% 5.0% 
10.5% $23.97 $24.80 $25.71 $26.69 $27.76 
11.0% 22.03 22.73 23.49 24.31 25.20 
11.5% 20.35 20.95 21.60 22.29 23.03 
12.0% 18.88 19.40 19.95 20.54 21.17 
12.5% 17.58 18.03 18.51 19.01 19.56 
Based on these figures, the Board authorized a counteroffer at $29 per share.181  
Evercore conveyed the counteroffer to Barclays. Evercore emphasized that "now [*31]  is not an 
opportune time for a sale, given the stock is at a 52-week low."182  Evercore also told Barclays 
that "[t]he low stock price reflects a misperception in the market that [Aruba] will miss its 
quarter. In fact, [Aruba] will beat consensus and have good guide."183  Barclays responded that 
the counteroffer was "not even within the realm of possibility."184  
 
 
N. HP Counters At Effectively The Same Price. 
After receiving Aruba's counter, HP management caucused with its advisors. They prepared 
talking points which stated, contrary to HP's synergy-based valuations, that HP did "not have the 
ability to reach anywhere near" Aruba's counteroffer.185  The talking points also focused on 
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timing, stressing that "[i]f we don't seize the opportunity now, there are many external pressure 
points that impact HP's ability to do a transaction with [Aruba] in the foreseeable future."186  
On February 7, 2015, Barclays told Evercore that any price increase would be on the scale of 
"quarters, not dollars."187  Evercore's reaction "was pretty constructive."188  Evercore 
"emphasized that [Aruba would] like to announce deal at or before the [Aruba] earnings 
announcement" because Aruba was "afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti's [*32]  did which could 
make the deal more challenging from the [Aruba] perspective."189  
During the call with Barclays, Evercore also explained that Aruba's share repurchases had 
rendered outdated the share count contained in its public disclosures. Aruba in fact had 119.1 
million shares outstanding, which was 4.5 million fewer than reported. Evercore told Barclays 
that HP should increase its price per share to account for the change.190  
On February 9, 2015, Barclays recalculated the deal price based on the new share count. With 
fewer shares, the same aggregate consideration of $2.563 billion resulted in a price per share of 
$23.89.191  This was still below the opening bid of $24.00 per share that HP had contemplated 
before Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr. That opening bid had equated to aggregate deal 
consideration of approximately $3 billion. With the lower share count, that same $3 billion 
enterprise value generated a price of $24.67 per share.192  HP decided to tell Aruba that its best 
and final bid was $24.67 per share, a figure that yielded the same enterprise value that HP 
originally intended to offer as its opening bid. Internally, HP described $24.67 as "the new 
$24.00," because [*33]  the price merely adjusted for the change in Aruba's public share 
count.193  
On February 9, 2015, Barclays communicated the counter of $24.67 per share to Evercore. The 
Aruba Board immediately met and authorized a counter at $25.00.194  Orr conveyed Aruba's 
ask of $25 per share to Neri.195  Orr also spoke to Whitman. Neither budged on price.196  
Later that day, HP sent Aruba a "Revised Indicative Non-Binding Proposal" that proposed a cash 
price of $24.67 per share.197  HP described the bid as its "best and final offer."198  The 
proposal represented a 51.6% premium to Aruba's closing price on the previous day and a 48.9% 
premium to Aruba's thirty-day average trading price.199  
 
 
O. Aruba Accepts. 
On February 10, 2015, the Aruba Board met to consider HP's revised proposal. Evercore, Orr, 
and Warmenhoven reported that the revised price resulted from considerable negotiation. They 
believed it represented HP's best and final offer. Qatalyst advised that it was unlikely that any 
other party would offer a higher price.200  The Board discussed "the recent weakness" in 
Aruba's share price and considered the alternative of continuing as a standalone company.201  
The Board also considered standing firm on its [*34]  ask for $25 per share. Ultimately, the 
Board decided to accept HP's offer of $24.67 per share.202  
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On February 18, 2015, the Aruba Board considered whether to permit HP to speak with Orr and 
other members of Aruba's senior management about employment opportunities.203  No one 
disclosed to the Board that HP previously had made clear to Orr that they wanted him to run 
Aruba after the merger, or that Orr had told HP that he was willing to do so. The Board 
consented to the discussions and waived the non-solicitation provision in the confidentiality 
agreement with HP.204  
With approval from the Aruba Board in hand, HP conducted additional due diligence. Evercore 
approached this phase as an extended audition for future work from HP. In late February 2015, 
Francis reported to his partners about "a really interesting negotiating dinner at Meg's house 
Thursday night" and that "it was fun to be the only banker in the room to help both sides think 
through some issues."205  A senior Evercore banker responded "That's HUGE! Meg is going to 
be very active. . . . Would be a great new relationship."206  Francis bragged about having 
effectively acted as HP's advisor: 
Agreed... I [*35]  think we made a pretty good impact from an advisory perspective, and she and 
I have known each other a long time socially through [P]rinceton events and when our kids were 
at Menlo school...please pardon the "pat on the back" nature of this comment, but after the 
meeting one of the people on our side said we had done a "masterful" job of taking [M]eg 
[Whitman] through the issues as if we were her advisor...let's hope that can help us get some 
traction in the future with her...207  
Rather than acting as a banker for Aruba, Evercore acted as a banker for the deal. 
 
 
P. The Deal Leaks. 
On February 25, 2015, one day before Aruba was scheduled to announce its earnings, 
Bloomberg News ran a story on the merger.208  Internally at Qatalyst, Boutros speculated that 
HP had leaked the news so that Aruba's "results and subsequent stock price reaction won't be 
easy to measure."209  Aruba's stock price jumped from $18.37 to $22.24 on the news.210  An 
analyst issued a report positing that, in light of the synergies from the merger, a deal price of 
"$28 or a premium of 25% from today's close is reasonable [for Aruba]."211  
On February 26, 2015, Aruba released its second quarter results. The Company [*36]  beat 
analyst expectations and hit management's guidance.212  Analysts called the results 
"impressive"213  and "[b]etter-[t]han-[e]xpected."214  One praised Aruba for "[a]nother 
[s]trong [q]uarter."215  An analyst at Citi doubted that Aruba would be willing to sell "at prices 
near the current trading level" and suggested that Aruba would not take "less than $30/share."216
 
On February 27, 2015, Aruba's stock closed at $24.81 per share, above the merger price.217  
That evening, the Aruba Board met to discuss how to respond. Qatalyst advised the Board that 
the deal still represented a 28% premium to Aruba's average trading price and a 44% premium to 
its thirty-day average price.218  Qatalyst also explained that the 10% price bump that Aruba 
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enjoyed after its earnings release matched the price performance of peer firms after reporting 
similar results.219  
Despite Qatalyst's report on the market reaction to peer companies reporting similar results, the 
Aruba Board concluded that "the higher trading price was primarily being driven by market 
speculation of a transaction, and not by changes in the fundamentals of the business."220  The 
Board discussed renewing its request for $25 per share but rejected the idea in favor of 
using [*37]  the stock price as leverage to insist on a lower termination fee and stronger deal 




Q. The Final Board Approvals 
On February 28, 2015, the HP Board met to consider the definitive merger agreement. Barclays 
prepared a discounted cash flow analysis based on Aruba's "management case"—the February 
Projections. The analysis produced a valuation range of $26.20 to $33.64 per share for Aruba on 
a standalone basis.223  With synergies, Barclays valued Aruba at between $27.53 and $39.69 
per share.224  Not surprisingly, Barclays opined that the deal price of $24.67 per share was fair 
to HP and its stockholders. The HP Board approved the merger agreement.225  
On March 1, 2015, the Aruba Board convened to consider the definitive merger agreement. Both 
Qatalyst and Evercore gave valuation presentations. Qatalyst's discounted cash flow valuation 
ranged from $23.23 to $26.76 per share.226  Evercore's discounted cash flow valuation ranged 
from $21.12 to $29.78 per share.227  Both firms opined that the deal price of $24.67 per share 
was fair to Aruba and its stockholders. The Aruba Board approved the merger agreement.228  
Getting the [*38]  Aruba deal signed was a key step in Qatalyst's effort to get back in HP's good 
graces. Afterwards, Quattrone reported to his partners that Whitman had "asked [Orr] to pass 
along the message to us that there is now a path towards 'rehabilitation' of our relationship."229  
Quattrone proposed to contact Whitman and "get her assurance that if we don't send the blast 
email" announcing Qatalyst's role in the deal, then Qatalyst would have "a clean slate going 
forward" with HP.230  His partners supported this approach, so Quattrone sent Whitman an 
email asking for a "clean slate."231  Quattrone also added "an appeal to your fairness," noting 




R. Stockholder Approval 
On March 2, 2015, Aruba and HP formally announced the merger.233  The final merger 
agreement (i) prohibited Aruba from soliciting competing offers and required the Aruba Board to 
continue to support the merger, subject to a fiduciary out and an out for an unsolicited superior 
proposal; (ii) included a $90 million termination fee; and (iii) provided a drop-dead date of 
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February 28, 2016.234  Orr and Keerti Melkote, Aruba's co-founder and Chief 
Technology [*39]  Officer, entered into voting agreements supporting the merger.235  
No competing bidder emerged. On May 1, 2015, Aruba held a meeting of stockholders to 
consider the merger.236  HN3  Under Delaware law, unless a corporation's constitutive 
documents impose a higher voting requirement, a merger requires the approval of a majority of 
the voting power represented by the corporation's outstanding shares.237  Approximately 
80.88% of Aruba's outstanding shares were represented at the meeting either in person or by 
proxy. Approximately 98% of those shares voted in favor of the merger.238  As a result, 
approximately 80% of the outstanding shares voted in favor of the merger, clearing the statutory 
requirement. The transaction closed on May 18, 2015.239  
 
 
S. This Litigation 
At the effective time of the merger, petitioners Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. and Verition 
Multi-Strategy Master Fund Ltd. (jointly, "Verition") owned in the aggregate 2,288,234 shares of 
Aruba's common stock.240  Verition filed this appraisal proceeding on August 28, 2015. The 
parties engaged in discovery for nearly two years. During discovery, Aruba's counsel took 
several aggressive and credibility-impairing positions. 
On May 5, 2016, [*40]  Verition noticed Whitman's deposition. Aruba promptly filed for a 
protective order seeking to limit the deposition to three hours. Aruba asserted that Whitman had 
"limited involvement in HP's acquisition of Aruba," that "Aruba and HP are aware of nothing in 
the vast discovery in this case to suggest there were any communications between Ms. Whitman 
and any representative of Aruba negotiating pricing terms of the Aruba deal," and that her view 
towards Qatalyst was immaterial because it "has no bearing on the fair value of Aruba as a stand-
alone company."241  While perhaps technically correct, these representations created a 
misleading picture of Whitman's involvement. Verition submitted exhibits in response to the 
motion that made the assertions look silly, and the evidence at trial subsequently reinforced their 
misleading character. I denied the motion for protective order and required Whitman to testify 
from day to day until the deposition was completed.242  
The parties next clashed when Verition moved to strike aspects of the report of Kevin Dages, 
Aruba's valuation expert. In his report, Dages relied on an email exchange between Aruba 
management and the Company's lawyers at Wilson Sonsini [*41]  Goodrich & Rosati, P.A. for 
information about stock-based compensation. During Dages's deposition, it became evident that 
Aruba had withheld the communication as privileged. Dages then attempted, unpersuasively, to 
suggest the citation had been a typographical error and that he had actually drawn the 
information from a different source that Aruba had produced. Complicating matters further, 
Verition showed that, during the deposition of another witness (Galvin), Aruba's lawyers 
engaged in substantive discussions about the email with the witness during a break. At the 
hearing, I expressed significant concern about Aruba's discovery conduct, but I concluded that I 




Verition dug deeper. Aruba had served a vast privilege log containing 20,000 entries and 
spanning 1,462 pages. Verition confirmed that at least 529 entries asserted privilege for 
communications about Aruba's projections and stock-based compensation. Those 
communications took place during the preparation of Aruba's proxy statement, and Wilson 
Sonsini lawyers were copied on the communications as part of the team, but the 
communications [*42]  were not privileged. Aruba had asserted privilege for those 
communications simply because a lawyer appeared on the document. After Aruba produced 
them, Verition renewed its motion to strike. This time, I found that Verition had shown a broader 
pattern of problematic conduct that had prejudiced Verition. It was too late to remedy the 
prejudice through other means, and I therefore struck the portions of Dages's report relating to 
stock-based compensation.244  
Trial took place from December 13-15, 2016. Through no fault of the parties, the post-trial 
proceedings became protracted. The parties initially completed post-trial briefing by March 30, 
2017, and post-trial argument was scheduled for May 17. I postponed the hearing once it became 
clear that the Delaware Supreme Court's forthcoming decision in DFC likely would have a 
significant effect on the legal landscape. The Delaware Supreme Court issued its decision on 
August 1. Both sides submitted supplemental briefs addressing the implications of DFC, and 
post-trial argument took place on September 29. 
While this matter was under submission, on December 14, 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court 
issued its decision in Dell. I invited the parties [*43]  to provide supplemental submissions 
addressing the implications of Dell and the extent to which attributes of the market for Aruba's 
stock resembled the attributes that the Delaware Supreme Court emphasized in Dell. The parties 
filed their submissions on January 26, 2018. 
 
 
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
HN4  Delaware's appraisal statute "allows stockholders who perfect their appraisal rights to 
receive 'fair value' for their shares as of the merger date instead of the merger consideration."245
 
[T]he purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable 
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it 
is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects 
what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length 
transaction.246  
Put differently, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest 
possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not 
exploited."247  
HN5  The trial court's "ultimate goal in an appraisal proceeding is to determine the 'fair or 
intrinsic value' of each share on [*44]  the closing date of the merger."248  To accomplish this 
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task, "the court should first envisage the entire pre-merger company as a 'going concern,' as a 
standalone entity, and assess its value as such."249  "Because the court 'strives to value the 
corporation itself as distinguished from a specific fraction of its shares as they may exist in the 
hands of a particular shareholder,' the court should not apply a minority discount when there is a 
controlling stockholder."250  The court should exclude "any synergies or other value expected 
from the merger giving rise to the appraisal proceeding."251  "[O]nce the total standalone value 
is determined, the court awards each petitioning stockholder his pro rata portion of this total . . . 
plus interest."252  
HN6  When seeking to prove fair value, parties may introduce "proof of value by any 
techniques or methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community and 
otherwise admissible in court."253  "[T]he statute assigns the Court of Chancery the duty to 
consider the relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties and then determine which 
method (and inputs), or combination of methods, yields the most reliable determination [*45]  of 
value."254  "But, whatever route it chooses, the trial court must justify its methodology (or 
methodologies) according to the facts of the case and relevant, accepted financial principles."255
 "Although the Court of Chancery has broad discretion to make findings of fact, those findings 
of fact have to be grounded in the record and reliable principles of corporate finance and 
economics."256  
In this case, "the relevant methods of valuation argued by the parties" are (i) Aruba's unaffected 
market price, (ii) the deal price, and (iii) competing discounted cash flow analyses. The degree of 
emphasis that the parties have placed on these methodologies has evolved. During discovery and 
at trial, both sides focused on their experts' discounted cash flow valuations. As the number of 
opinions that focused on the deal price mounted, the respondent placed greater emphasis on that 
metric, and the petitioners responded by attacking the process that led to the deal. After DFC, the 
respondent stressed a combination of the unaffected market price and the deal price. After Dell, 




A. The Unaffected Market [*46]  Price 
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell teach that HN7  if a 
company's shares trade in a market having attributes consistent with the assumptions underlying 
a traditional version of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets hypothesis,257  then 
the unaffected trading price provides evidence of the fair value of a proportionate interest in the 
company as a going concern. That evidence is more reliable than the single estimate of any one 
individual, be he a knowledgeable market participant, corporate insider, valuation professional, 
or trial judge.258  Under this standard, Aruba's unaffected market price provides persuasive 
evidence of fair value. 
 
 
1. The Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis 
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Both Dell and DFC endorse the [*47]  efficient capital markets hypothesis and its predictions 
about the reliability of market prices. In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "real 
world transaction prices can be the most probative evidence of fair value even through appraisal's 
particular lens."259  The high court observed that "[m]arket prices are typically viewed superior 
to other valuation techniques because, unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow model, 
the market price should distill the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly 
available information about a given company and the value of its shares."260  The court added 
that, from the perspective of economics, when the subject company's shares are "widely traded 
on a public market based upon a rich information base," then the fair value of a proportionate 
interest in the company as a going concern would "likely be best reflected by the prices at which 
[the] shares were trading as of the merger."261  
In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that "the price produced by an efficient market is 
generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an 
expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation [*48]  imperatives of a well-heeled 
client."262  The court explained that, when the market for a company's stock has attributes 
associated with efficient trading, the stock price 
reflects the judgments of many stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on 
public filings, industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts. In these 
circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information about a 
company, and in trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's 
adjusted, consensus valuation of the company.263  
The court concluded that, when the market for a company's shares has the requisite attributes, the 
stock price is "likely a possible proxy for fair value."264  
Under Dell and DFC, the critical question is whether the market for the subject company's shares 
has attributes associated with market efficiency. In Dell, the high court described the relevant 
attributes as follows: "A market is more likely efficient, or semi-strong efficient, if it has many 
stockholders; no controlling stockholder; highly active trading; and if information about the 
company is widely available and easily disseminated to the market."265  
In both [*49]  Dell and DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court found that the market for the subject 
company's shares had the necessary attributes. The Dell decision described the market for Dell's 
stock as follows: 
Dell's stock traded on the NASDAQ under the ticker symbol DELL. The Company's market 
capitalization of more than $20 billion ranked it in the top third of the S&P 500. Dell had a deep 
public float and was actively traded as more than 5% of Dell's shares were traded each week. The 
stock had a bid-ask spread of approximately 0.08%. It was also widely covered by equity 
analysts, and its share price quickly reflected the market's view on breaking developments. Based 
on these metrics, the record suggests the market for Dell stock was semi-strong efficient, 
meaning that the market's digestion and assessment of all publicly available information 
concerning Dell was quickly impounded into the Company's stock price. For example, on 
January 14, 2013, Dell's stock jumped 9.8% within a minute of Bloomberg breaking the news of 
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the Company's take-private talks, and the stock closed up 13% from the day prior—on a day the 
S&P as a whole fell 0.1%.266  
The DFC decision described the market for DFC's stock in similar, [*50]  albeit more 
abbreviated, terms: 
DFC's shares were traded on the NASDAQ exchange from 2005 until the merger. Throughout its 
history as a public company, the record suggests that DFC never had a controlling stockholder, it 
had a deep public float of 39.6 million shares, and, it had an average daily trading volume just 
short of one million shares. DFC's share price moved sharply in reaction to information about the 
company's performance, the industry, and the overall economy . . . .267  
The high court later noted that "DFC's stock was listed on a major U.S. exchange, traded 
actively, and had moved sharply over the years when the company was poised for growth or 
facing dimming prospects."268  
In neither case did an expert render an opinion on market efficiency, as is common in federal 
securities law actions when a plaintiff seeks to invoke the presumption of reliance associated 
with the fraud-on-the-market theory.269  Nor was all of the market evidence part of the trial 
record. In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court cited record evidence for some of the information 
about DFC's stock profile; it drew other information from DFC's public filings with the SEC or 
from an expert report addressing valuation issues. [*51] 270  In Dell, the Delaware Supreme 
Court similarly drew much of the market-related information from public filings with the SEC or 
from an expert report addressing valuation issues.271  
In this case, as in Dell and DFC, no expert offered an opinion, pro or con, on whether the subject 
company's shares traded in an efficient market. During trial, the parties did not emphasize the 
attributes of the market for Aruba's common stock. Nevertheless, information drawn from 
sources comparable to those the Delaware Supreme Court used in Dell and DFC indicates that 
the market for Aruba's common stock had basic attributes consistent with what the high court 
found sufficient in those decisions: 
• Aruba's shares traded on the NASDAQ through the date of the merger under the symbol 
ARUN.272  
• Aruba did not have a controlling stockholder. 
• Aruba made public filings in compliance with the disclosure requirements imposed by federal 
securities laws. 
• Thirty-three securities analysts covered Aruba.273  
• Aruba's weekly trading volume was 9.5 million shares or 8.7% of total shares outstanding.274  
• Aruba's bid-ask spread was 0.055%.275  
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The following table compares the numerical attributes of Aruba's common stock with the 
comparable attributes for the subject companies in Dell and DFC. 
  DFC Dell Aruba 
Market Cap. $375 million $20 billion $2.5 billion 
Shares in public 37.5 million 1.45 billion 104 million 
float       
Public float as % 95% 85% 96% 
of outstanding       
Bid-ask spread 0.098% 0.08% 0.055% 
# of analysts 10 33 33 
Given these attributes, Aruba's stock price is "likely a possible proxy for fair value."276  
In addition, as in Dell, there is evidence that the Company's stock price reacted quickly to the 
release of news about the Company.277  
• When Aruba announced Project Greyhound after the market closed on August 26, 2014, the 
stock price rose by 5% the next day, closing at $21.26 on a day when the S&P 500 was stagnant. 
• When Aruba announced its first quarter fiscal year 2015 earnings after the market closed on 
November 20, 2014, Aruba's stock price dropped by 14% on November 21 on a day when the 
S&P 500 was up 0.5%. 
• When Bloomberg News reported that HP was in talks to buy Aruba on February 25, 2015, 
Aruba's stock price rose 21%. The news came out at 3:02 p.m. and, within one minute, Aruba's 
stock price had increased [*53]  12.7%. By 3:11 p.m., the price had increased to $22.86, before 
closing at $22.24 at 4 p.m. The same day, the S&P 500 decreased 0.1%. 
• When Aruba announced its second quarter fiscal year 2015 earnings after the market closed on 
February 26, 2015, the stock price increased the next day by 9.7%. That same day, the S&P 500 
decreased by 0.3%. 
• When the merger was confirmed and the merger price of $24.67 announced on March 2, 2015, 
the stock price decreased slightly to close at $24.65. 
Obviously, these are anecdotal observations and not event studies, but they compare favorably 
with the Dell court's observation that Dell's share price "quickly reflected the market's view on 
breaking developments," citing, as an example, that "on January 14, 2013, Dell's stock jumped 
9.8% within a minute of Bloomberg breaking the news of the Company's take-private talks, and 
the stock closed up 13% from the day prior—on a day the S&P 500 as a whole fell 0.1%."278  
Similar evidence in this case reinforces the conclusion that Aruba's stock price leading up to the 





2. Evidence Of Market Mispricing 
The petitioners dispute the reliability of Aruba's market price [*54]  in this case, contending that 
HP timed its acquisition to take advantage of a trough in the market. They rely on a range of 
authorities, including the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration 
Corp., which stated that, if an acquisition "was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or 
a low point in the company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive 
development, the appraised value may be adjusted to account for those factors."280  
The petitioners argue that the market mispricing in this case began after the Company reported 
positive quarterly results in May 2014. Revenue exceeded both management guidance and Wall 
Street consensus estimates,281  but the Company reported a gross margin of 70.5%, below the 
consensus estimate of 72% and Aruba's "longstanding target of 71-73%."282  The miss 
triggered harsh analyst coverage,283  and Aruba's stock price dropped 12.11% on the news, 
declining from $20.06 to $17.63. As evidence of the market overreaction, the petitioners rely on 
internal assessments by Aruba management.284  
To address the gross margin issue, Aruba management developed Project Greyhound.285  
Management undertook the project because the [*55]  "Company value [was] not adequately 
reflected in [the] stock price."286  Aruba announced record results in August 2014 and 
simultaneously announced the implementation of Project Greyhound.287  Analysts had mixed 
reactions.288  Aruba's stock price rose by roughly 9%, from $20.24 to $22.01.289  As evidence 
of continued mispricing, the petitioners rely on Aruba management's internal view that it would 
take "a couple of quarters" after the implementation of Project Greyhound for Wall Street to 
credit the results.290  
The petitioners contend that matters worsened in November 2014. That month, Aruba reported 
on an "outstanding quarter" that included "[r]ecord revenues" that exceeded "the top end of [its] 
guidance range" and improved margins thanks to Project Greyhound.291  But Aruba also 
announced a range of revenue guidance for the upcoming quarter that was 1% lower at the 
midpoint than the pre-announcement analyst consensus.292  Analysts fixated on the lowered 
guidance. Aruba's stock dropped by 14%, closing at $18.82.293  As evidence of the market 
overreaction, the petitioners rely on the internal assessments of Aruba management, who 
explained that they lowered guidance simply to be [*56]  prudent and not because of any change 
in the business dynamics.294  They also rely on internal assessments by the HP deal team, who 
viewed Aruba's strong results as validating their internal business case295  and saw the price 
drop as an opportunity to buy Aruba at a discount.296  
After Dell and DFC, I do not believe that the petitioners' evidence provides any basis to question 
the integrity of Aruba's pre-announcement market price as an indicator of fair value. As a 
threshold matter, it is not clear that Glassman has continuing relevance to a widely held, publicly 
traded entity. Although the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman did not limit its comments 
about the appraisal standard to any particular context, the case involved a short-form merger in 
which a controlling stockholder eliminated the minority.297  Aruba was not a controlled 
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company, and the market for its shares exhibited the attributes that the Delaware Supreme Court 
in Dell and DFC found sufficient to give effect to the implications of the semi-strong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis. 
In Dell, at the trial level, I found "widespread and compelling evidence of a valuation gap 
between the market's perception [*57]  and the Company's operative reality."298  As I viewed 
the evidence, "[t]he gap was driven by (i) analysts' focus on short-term, quarter-by-quarter results 
and (ii) the Company's nearly $14 billion investment in its transformation, which had not yet 
begun to generate the anticipated results."299  In making this finding, I relied on record 
evidence indicating that (i) Michael Dell and other members of management valued the company 
at levels significantly above the market price in light of its ongoing transformation and a related 
cost-savings initiative,300  (ii) the financial advisors to the special committee running the sale 
process generated valuations implying values for the company that far exceeded its market 
price,301  and (iii) Mr. Dell and the special committee's advisors (including two financial 
advisors and a consulting firm) believed that the valuation gap existed because the company's 
stockholders were focused on the short-term rather than the long-term.302  
On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, in light of the attributes of the market for 
Dell's shares and the implications of the semi-strong form of the efficient capital markets 
hypothesis, my reliance on the views [*58]  of these knowledgeable insiders constituted an abuse 
of discretion.303  I had cited various analyst reports as evidence of the contrast between 
external views and the insiders' assessments. The high court found that the analyst reports 
showed "just the opposite: analysts scrutinized Dell's long-range outlook when evaluating the 
Company and setting price targets, and the market was capable of accounting for Dell's recent 
mergers and acquisitions and their prospects in its valuation of the Company."304  More 
broadly, the Delaware Supreme Court held that my finding "ignored the efficient market 
hypothesis long endorsed by this court."305  The high court found that "[t]he apparent 
efficiency of Dell's pre-signing stock market and the long-term approach of its analysts 
undermine concerns of a 'valuation gap.'"306  
In this case, I regard the petitioners' evidence of market mispricing as considerably weaker than 
what I abused my discretion by crediting in Dell. The evidence in Dell involved the company's 
likelihood of successfully completing [*59]  a corporate transformation after spending $14 
billion to acquire eleven businesses over three years. The evidence in this case concerns revenue 
guidance for an upcoming quarter and the implications of a cost-cutting effort (Project 
Greyhound). As in Dell, the analyst reports show that market observers were assessing these 
variables. As in Dell, there is no indication that management did not try to communicate 
forthrightly with the market. In contrast to Dell, the internal concerns that Orr and other 
members of management expressed in this case lacked the degree of analytical and valuation-
based support that accompanied the critiques by Mr. Dell, his management team, and the special 
committee's advisors. In this case, the internal concerns seem more like reactive expressions of 
frustration. To reiterate, the evidence in Dell was insufficient to support my finding regarding the 
existence of a valuation gap. Indeed, the Delaware Supreme Court regarded it as the equivalent 
of no evidence at all.307  The weaker evidence here is insufficient to undermine the reliability 
of Aruba's unaffected market price. 
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The DFC decision points to the same conclusion. There, the Court of [*60]  Chancery found 
DFC's performance "appeared to be in a trough, with future performance depending on the 
outcome of regulatory decision-making that was largely out of the company's control."308  The 
trial court relied on record evidence that the acquirer "was aware of DFC's trough performance 
and uncertain outlook" and that "these attributes were at the core of [the acquirer's] investment 
thesis to obtain assets with potential upside at a favorable price."309  On appeal, the Delaware 
Supreme Court explained that "the market's assessment of the future cash flows necessarily takes 
regulatory risk into account as it does with all the other reasonable uncertain factors that affect a 
company's future."310  The senior tribunal found that "the record reveals that equity analysts, 
equity buyers, debt analysts, debt providers and others were in fact attuned to the regulatory risks 
facing DFC."311  The same reasoning applies here in terms of the ability of equity analysts and 
other market participants to assess the risk associated with Project Greyhound and Aruba's ability 
to meet management guidance. 
The Delaware Supreme Court in DFC also questioned whether a trial court should have relied 
on [*61]  evidence that the buyer thought it was getting a good deal to support the possibility of 
underpricing: 
One would expect a buyer to think it made a wise decision with an upside, and, to be candid, it is 
in tension with the statute itself to argue that the subjective view of post-merger value of the 
acquirer can be used to value the respondent company in an appraisal, as the statute's exclusion 
of transaction-specific value seems to be directed at the concern a buyer who pays fair value 
should not have its economic upside for taking that risk expropriated in the appraisal process, a 
result that if it were the law, would discourage sales transactions valuable to selling stockholders. 
That a buyer views itself as having struck a good deal is far from reliable evidence that the 
resulting price from a competitive bidding process is an unreliable indicator of fair value. . . . 
[O]ne would think that the buyer who paid the highest price in a competitive process had the 
most confidence there was an upside and must think that post-purchase gains would justify its 
purchase; otherwise, no sale would ever occur in the world. That [the acquirer] expected to profit 
does not mean that the collective [*62]  view of value that results from the deal price is not a 
reliable indicator of fair value; to hold otherwise, is to adopt a non-binary view of fair value in 
which only the upside view of what could happen in the future is taken into account.312  
This passage cautions against regarding HP's belief that it had seized upon an opportune time to 
purchase Aruba as sufficient to undercut the reliability of Aruba's market price. 
 
 
3. Bundling Aruba's Earnings Release With The Merger Announcement 
So far, the petitioners' evidence of a market trough or other mispricing is conceptually similar to 
the types of evidence that the Delaware Supreme Court rejected in Dell and DFC. But the 
petitioners advanced another argument that falls into a slightly different category because it 
involved Aruba and HP making conscious decisions about when to release information. At the 
end of January 2015, HP offered to acquire Aruba for $23.25 per share. During the first week of 
February, while Aruba was considering its response, another analyst report criticized the 
Company, and the stock price fell again, closing around $16.07 the day after the report.313  
34 
 
Contrary [*63]  to the market's perception, Aruba management knew internally that Aruba was 
having an excellent quarter and would beat its guidance.314  But, rather than correcting the 
market's perception, Aruba management proposed to time the announcement of the merger to 
coincide with the announcement of Aruba's February 2015 earnings.315  Companies often 
announce significant items as part of an earnings release, particularly if the earnings are bad and 
the news is good (or vice versa).316  In this case, Aruba management believed that an increase 
in the stock price would hurt their chances of getting the deal approved. Providing both pieces of 
information simultaneously would blur the market's reaction to Aruba's strong quarterly results 
and help get the deal approved.317  
In Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court implied that a petitioner might be able to call into question 
the integrity of the market price if they proved that management had withheld information from 
the market or misled investors. As one of its several reasons for holding that I abused my 
discretion, the high court noted that I "expressly found no evidence that information failed to 
flow freely or [*64]  that management purposefully tempered investors' expectations for the 
Company so that it could eventually take over the Company at a fire-sale price."318  My 
prediction of the law before the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Dell would have been that 
scienter did not matter for an appraisal case where the sole litigable question is valuation rather 
than culpability. But this passage indicates that HN8  whether management causes an 
informational distortion is pertinent not only for a breach of fiduciary duty claim or fraud action, 
but for an appraisal proceeding as well. 
In this case, the petitioners contend that Aruba and HP manipulated the timing of announcing 
Aruba's strong quarterly results and the merger to interfere with investors' ability to perceive 
Aruba's standalone value. The petitioners do not contend that management never provided the 
quarterly results or falsified the quarterly results, only that they bundled them together with the 
announcement of the merger. 
As framed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Dell and DFC, the semi-strong form of the 
efficient capital markets hypothesis does not contemplate that directional error will arise from 
the order in which information is released [*65]  or from bundling information together. 
Releasing information simultaneously or in close proximity might make it difficult for an expert 
to disentangle the price reaction for purposes of an event study, but the market still would have 
the information and would respond. As the high court stated in Dell, when a market is efficient, 
"a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information about a company and, in 
trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the market's adjusted, consensus 
valuation of the company."319  And as the high court observed in DFC, "in an efficient market, 
you can trust prices, for they impound all available information about the value of each 
security."320  Aruba's stock traded briefly above the deal price, indicating the market took into 
account both the announcement of the deal and Aruba's strong results. Viewed within the 
framework established by DFC and Dell, the record does not provide a persuasive reason to 
question the reliability of Aruba's trading price based on the decision by Aruba management to 





4. The [*66]  Conclusion Regarding The Market Price Evidence 
Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price was $17.13.322  Viewed within the 
framework established by DFC and Dell, Aruba's market price provides reliable evidence of the 
going concern value of the firm. 
 
 
B. The Deal Price 
The Delaware Supreme Court's recent decisions in DFC and Dell hold that HN9  when a widely 
held, publicly traded company has been sold in an arm's-length transaction, the deal price has 
"heavy, if not overriding, probative value."323  Applying that standard in this case, the merger 
price carries heavy weight, although the inclusion of elements of value arising from the merger 
requires adjustments to generate an indication of fair value. 
 
 
1. The Role Of The Deal Price 
On three occasions, the Delaware Supreme Court has declined to establish a presumption 
regarding the relationship between the deal price and fair value. In Golden Telecom, the high 
court explained that "Section 262(h) neither dictates nor even contemplates that the Court of 
Chancery should consider the transactional market price of the underlying company. Rather, in 
determining 'fair value,' the statute instructs that the court 'shall take into account all relevant 
factors.'"324  The [*67]  court reasoned that "[r]equiring the Court of Chancery to defer—
conclusively or presumptively—to the merger price, even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged 
transactional process, would contravene the unambiguous language of the statute and the 
reasoned holdings of our precedent."325  
In DFC, the Delaware Supreme Court again rejected a request to establish a presumption that the 
deal price reflects fair value, seeing "no license in the statue for creating a presumption" and 
expressing doubt about "our ability to craft, on a general basis, the precise pre-conditions that 
would be necessary to invoke a presumption of that kind."326  At the same time, the Delaware 
Supreme Court cautioned that its 
refusal to craft a statutory presumption in favor the deal price when certain conditions pertain 
does not in any way signal our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale value resulting 
from a robust market check will often be the most reliable evidence of fair value, and that 
second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of many sophisticated parties 
with a real stake in the matter is hazardous.327  
The Delaware Supreme Court also cautioned that "we have little quibble with the 
economic [*68]  argument that the price of a merger that results from a robust market check, 
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against the back drop of a rich information base and a welcoming environment for potential 
buyers, is probative of the company's fair value."328  
The DFC court reversed a decision by this court to give only one-third weight to the deal price. 
The high court noted that the trial court had made the following post-trial findings of fact: 
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that lasted approximately two years in 
which financial and strategic buyers had an open opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal 
protections; 
ii) the company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length sale; and 
iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the market check.329  
The high court further observed that 
[a]lthough there is no presumption in favor of the deal price, under the conditions found by the 
Court of Chancery, economic principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal 
price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy 
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a 
profit had a chance to [*69]  bid.330  
The Delaware Supreme Court determined that the Court of Chancery's "decision to give one-
third weight to each metric was unexplained and in tension with the Court of Chancery's own 
findings about the robustness of the market check."331  The senior tribunal therefore reversed 
and remanded the case so the trial court could "reassess [its] conclusion as to fair value in light 
of our decision."332  
Most recently, in Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court reiterated that "there is no requirement that 
the court assign some mathematical weight to the deal price."333  On the facts presented, 
however, the high court held that I "erred in not assigning any mathematical weight to the deal 
price" under circumstances suggesting that "the deal price deserved heavy, if not dispositive 
weight."334  Those circumstances included (i) stock market attributes associated with efficient 
trading335  and (ii) a sale process that involved "fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all 
logical buyers, and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell's own 
votes."336  
The decisions in DFC and Dell identify factors that make the deal price so probative that a trial 
court abuses its discretion by failing [*70]  to give it enough weight, but they provide less 
guidance for determining when a process is sufficiently bad to warrant discounting the deal 
price. One passage in the DFC decision suggests an answer to the latter inquiry by stating that 
the purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable 
value that might have been procured had every domino fallen out of the company's way; rather, it 
is to make sure that they receive fair compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects 
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what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length 
transaction.337  
This test focuses on whether the deal in question was an arm's-length transaction, and it appears 
to rule out inquiry into whether a different transaction process might have achieved a superior 
result. A passage from Dell points in a similar direction, where the high court stated: "The issue 
in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid. Rather, the key 
inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were not exploited."338  As with the passage 
from DFC, the passage from Dell appears to discount whether a different approach [*71]  might 
have done better. The Dell test turns on exploitation. 
 
 
2. The Deal Price In This Case 
In this case, the HP-Aruba transaction was a third-party, arm's-length merger. HP was not a 
controller engaged in squeezing out the minority. Nor was the transaction a management buyout 
where insiders' informational advantages might have raised concerns. The transaction did not 
involve particular stockholders, such as members of management or a large blockholder, rolling 
over their shares or otherwise receiving differential treatment. Nothing about the deal structure 
could be considered exploitive. 
The ultimate decision makers for Aruba—the Board and the stockholders—did not labor under 
any conflicts of interest. The Board was disinterested and independent. Of its eight members, six 
were experienced, outside directors. Aruba's stockholder base was widely dispersed. No one 
identified any stockholders with a dominant position or divergent interests. 
Aruba negotiated with HP over the price. On January 31, 2015, HP sent Aruba a written 
indication of interest for a cash transaction at $23.25 per share, for an aggregate valuation of 
$2.563 billion.339  Aruba countered at $29 per share.340  While HP considered [*72]  Aruba's 
counter, it learned that Aruba in fact had fewer shares outstanding than HP had believed.341  
HP had based the $23.25 per share price on Aruba's old share count. When HP recalculated its 
offer to reflect the correct share count, the same aggregate consideration of $2.563 billion 
resulted in a price per share of $23.89.342  Based on that calculation, HP raised its bid to $24.67 
per share, or just over 3% on an as-adjusted basis.343  Aruba asked for $25.00 per share, but HP 
held firm.344  
There is evidence that the price credited Aruba with a portion of the substantial synergies that the 
transaction would generate from combining Aruba's strength in wireless networking with HP's 
strength in wired systems.345  HP's final internal analysis, reflecting independent research and 
validation by McKinsey, anticipated total synergies of $1.41 billion, consisting of revenue 
synergies of $1.175 billion and cost synergies of $235 million.346  
HP and Aruba agreed to terms for the merger agreement that the petitioners have not 
meaningfully challenged. The merger agreement contained a no-shop clause that prevented 
Aruba from communicating with third parties about an acquisition proposal unless both the 
Aruba Board's fiduciary duties required it and the acquisition proposal was reasonably likely to 
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lead to a superior proposal.347  The merger agreement granted HP an unlimited match right, 
with five days to match the first superior proposal and two days to match any subsequent 
increase,348  and during the match period Aruba had to negotiate exclusively and in good faith 
with HP.349  The merger agreement provided that if the Aruba Board complied with the no-
solicitation provision, including the match right, then the Aruba Board could terminate the 
merger agreement to accept a superior proposal after first paying HP a termination fee of $90 
million, or 3% of equity value.350  This combination of defensive provisions would not have 
supported [*74]  a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.351  
Considering these factors as a whole, the HP-Aruba merger looks like a run-of-the-mill, third-
party deal. Nothing about it appears exploitive. Particularly given the inclusion of synergies, 
there is good reason to think that the deal price exceeded fair value and, if anything, should 
establish a ceiling for fair value.352  
 
 
a. The Absence Of Competition 
In an effort to undermine the probative value of the deal price, the petitioners argue that HP did 
not face a meaningful threat of competition. They note that the recent decisions in Dell and DFC 
cited with approval the open nature of the deal processes in those cases.353  
The Dell and DFC decisions did not hold that a deal price would be rendered unreliable in the 
absence of competition. Instead, the high court indicated that, for an appraisal petitioner to call 
into question a deal process based on lack of competition, the petitioner should be able to point 
to a likely bidder and make a persuasive showing that increased competition would have led to a 
better result.354  The Dell decision stressed that "[f]air value entails at minimum a [*75]  price 
some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which no class of buyers in the market would 
pay."355  "[I]f a company is one that no strategic buyer is interested in buying, it does not 
suggest a higher value, but a lower one."356  
Other aspects of the Dell and DFC decisions similarly discounted the importance of competition. 
The DFC decision stressed that the purpose of an appraisal "is not to make sure that the 
petitioners get the highest conceivable value,"357  and the Dell decision cautioned that "[t]he 
issue . . . is not whether a negotiator has extracted the highest possible bid."358  Competition 
might help a seller extract a higher price, but that is not the focus of the inquiry under Dell and 
DFC. 
The role of competition also must be evaluated in light of the Delaware Supreme Court's 
endorsement of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. At the trial level, Chancellor Bouchard 
found in DFC and I found in Dell that the market prices of the acquired firms were depressed and 
had not been representative of fair value. From that factual starting point, we examined the sale 
processes for evidence of competition or a meaningful threat of competition that would 
be [*76]  sufficient to overcome the market mispricing and generate fair value. On appeal in 
DFC and Dell, the Delaware Supreme Court relied on the efficient capital markets hypothesis to 
hold that the factual findings about market troughs constituted abuses of discretion. From that 
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different factual starting point, there is less need for competition among bidders to drive a 
meaningful sale process, and less need for a court to delve into the details. With a reliable market 
price as the base line, an arm's-length deal at a premium is non-exploitive. By definition, it 
provides stockholders with "fair compensation for their shares," defined as "what they deserve to 
receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm's-length transaction."359  
In this case, the petitioners proved that HP knew it did not face a meaningful threat of 
competition. In October 2014, during its first pass at Aruba, HP's executives established a "pretty 
open dialogue" with Orr,360  and he informed HP that Aruba was "not running a sales 
process."361  Orr did not make any effort to create the impression of competition by "posturing 
about trying to pin [HP] against someone else."362  HP consequently did not feel any pressure 
to [*77]  bid. After three full months of discussions and due diligence, HP still had not put a 
number on the table. 
Aruba has pointed out that, at the end of November 2014, Orr decided that the discussion had 
dragged on long enough, and he terminated them with the Aruba Board's backing.363  Under 
different circumstances, this move might have given Aruba some bargaining leverage by 
signaling that Aruba was prepared to pursue its standalone plan.364  But in this case, Orr 
undercut that implication when he had dinner with Whitman and Neri on January 21, 2015. After 
Whitman told Orr that HP still wanted to acquire Aruba,365  Orr responded enthusiastically and 
proposed to announce the deal at an industry conference during the first week of March.366  
Days later, when an HP executive called Orr to say that HP would be sending over its proposal, 
Orr suggested getting a deal announced by the end of February.367  
HP's bidding tactics suggest that HP knew it did not face competition. Before the dinner with 
Orr, HP planned to open with $24.00 per share and negotiate up to $25.00.368  After Orr's 
response, HP lowered its opening bid to $23.25.369  When Aruba countered at $29, Barclays 
told Evercore that any price [*78]  increase would be on the scale of "quarters, not dollars."370  
Based on a new share count that Evercore provided, HP recalculated its opening bid as equating 
to $23.89 per share.371  This was still below the planned opening bid of $24.00 per share that 
HP contemplated before Whitman and Neri had dinner with Orr. With the lower share count, the 
same enterprise value generated a price of $24.67 per share.372  HP told Aruba that its best and 
final bid was $24.67, which HP internally called "the new $24.00" because the price merely 
adjusted for the change in Aruba's public share count.373  HP increased its bid to $24.67 and 
refused to budge. The deal ended up at the number HP had planned to use for its opening bid.374
 
So far, so good for the petitioners. But although they proved that HP knew it did not face a 
meaningful threat of competition, they failed to identify any other likely bidder who would have 
paid more for Aruba. The Dell decision teaches that "[f]air value entails at minimum a price 
some buyer is willing to pay."375  Elaborating, the court emphasized that, if no one else is 
interested in buying, "it does not suggest a higher value, but a lower one."376  In this case, 
Aruba (through Qatalyst) [*79]  contacted six potential strategic partners; none were 
interested.377  Nor did anyone come forward after the deal announcement. Under Dell and 
DFC, the petitioners failed to undermine the deal price by showing a lack of competition. 
Instead, the lack of competition supports the reliability of the deal price. 
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Under Dell and DFC, the test instead is whether the Aruba-HP transaction was exploitive. "[T]he 
purpose of an appraisal is not to make sure that the petitioners get the highest conceivable value . 
. . ."378  This decision already has found that Aruba's stock price exhibited attributes associated 
with the premises of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. The merger consideration of $24.67 
per share provided Aruba's stockholders with a significant premium over a reliable market price. 
As a result, the Aruba-HP transaction provided stockholders with "fair compensation for their 
shares," defined as "what they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in 
an arm's-length transaction."379  
 
 
b. The Negotiators' Incentives 
The petitioners next contend that the deal price in this case is unreliable because Aruba's 
negotiators were compromised. The petitioners argue [*80]  that Aruba's bankers catered to HP, 
and that Orr faced divergent interests of his own. Citing DFC and various trial court rulings, they 
argue that the deal price should be discounted because Aruba lacked representatives who 
engaged in vigorous, arm's-length bargaining on its behalf.380  
As with the element of competition, the petitioners regard the negotiators' incentives as a thread 
which, if pulled, could unravel the sweater. But like competition, the concept of negotiation 
cannot be excised from the broader framework that the DFC and Dell decisions established. The 
Dell opinion cautioned explicitly that "[t]he issue . . . is not whether a negotiator has extracted 
the highest possible bid."381  If this were a case where the market price was depressed or 
unreliable, then perhaps a detailed inquiry into issues like competition or negotiation might 
become important in assessing whether the deal process achieved fair value. HN11  In a 
scenario where the underlying market price is reliable, competition and negotiation become 
secondary. Under those circumstances, an arm's-length deal at a premium over the market price 
is non-exploitive. By definition, it gives stockholders "what would fairly [*81]  be given to them 
in an arm's-length transaction."382  
In this case, the petitioners proved that the Aruba's bankers catered to HP. Once Whitman 
refused to work opposite Qatalyst,383  Quattrone and Boutros perceived HP's stance as an 
existential threat to their technology-centered franchise.384  They wanted and needed to get 
back on HP's good side. Their primary goal from that point on was to rehabilitate their 
relationship with HP.385  
Evercore also wanted to get on HP's good side. The firm was a new entrant in the Silicon Valley 
market and had recently hired Francis as "their first tech sector person."386  Evercore 
understood the value of completing a highly visible deal as their first Silicon Valley 
transaction,387  and they saw the sale process as an extended audition for HP's business.388  
During meetings between Aruba and HP, Evercore positioned itself as the banker to the deal. 
After one session, Francis reported to his colleagues that "it was fun to be the only banker in the 
room and help both sides think through some issues."389  He even bragged about having done 
"a 'masterful' job of taking [M]eg [Whitman] through the issues as if we were her advisor."390  
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Even accepting that investment [*82]  bankers are always on the lookout for new clients, 
Evercore's eagerness in this case went far enough to undermine its role as Aruba's advisor. 
Warmenhoven testified that the bankers' relationships with HP did not negatively affect the 
negotiations and that having two bankers meant Aruba had "two star players on the same 
team."391  Orr testified similarly.392  Notwithstanding this testimony, I credit that the bankers' 
interests made them less effective negotiators than they might have been 
The petitioners likewise proved that Orr had divergent interests, although his motivations were 
subtler and less openly mercenary. The sale to HP helped Orr achieve a combination of personal 
and professional goals that included hastening his return to a personally fulfilling retirement.393
 That said, he was not about to leave Aruba under circumstances that would hurt the Company 
or its employees.394  From his standpoint, selling Aruba to HP was the perfect solution.395  
As with the issue of competition, the answer on negotiation is that the petitioners proved what 
they sought to prove, but that is not enough to call into question the deal price for purposes of 
appraisal. [*83]  Once again, "[t]he issue in an appraisal is not whether a negotiator has extracted 
the highest possible bid. Rather, the key inquiry is whether the dissenters got fair value and were 
not exploited."396  "[F]air value is just that, 'fair.' It does not mean the highest possible price 
that a company might have sold for had Warren Buffett negotiated for it on his best day and the 
Lenape who sold Manhattan on their worst."397  
The evidence does not convince me that the bankers, Orr, the Aruba Board, and the stockholders 
who approved the transaction all accepted a deal price that left a portion of Aruba's fundamental 
value on the table. Perhaps different negotiators could have extracted a greater share of the 
synergies from HP in the form of a higher deal price. Maybe if Orr had been less eager, or if 
Qatalyst had not been relegated to the back room, then HP would have opened at $24 per share. 
Perhaps with a brash Qatalyst banker leading the negotiations, unhampered by the Autonomy 
incident, Aruba might have negotiated more effectively and gotten HP above $25 per share. An 
outcome along these lines would have resulted in HP sharing a greater portion of the anticipated 
synergies with Aruba's stockholders. [*84]  It would not have changed Aruba's standalone value. 
Hence, it would not have affected Aruba's fair value for purposes of an appraisal. 
 
 
3. Deducting Synergies 
Under Dell and DFC, the deal price in this case has substantial probative value. But the evidence 
shows that the deal generated significant synergies. Under the DFC decision, it is to be assumed 
that HP shared some of those with Aruba's stockholders.398  HN12  To derive an estimate of 
fair value, the court must exclude "any synergies or other value expected from the merger giving 
rise to the appraisal proceeding itself."399  
The parties agree that it is not possible to determine with precision what portion of the final deal 
price reflects synergy value. The respondent's expert conceded that "[t]he percentage of 
synergies actually paid by HP to Aruba cannot be accurately measured."400  
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Delaware decisions have recognized the difficulties inherent in quantifying synergies.401  
Despite these difficulties, this court has used a deal-price-less-synergies metric. In Union Illinois, 
Chief Justice Strine, then a Vice Chancellor, started with the deal consideration of $10.20 per 
share.402  He then discounted that figure by 13% to reflect the synergies captured [*85]  by the 
seller, basing that figure on the opinion of the respondent's valuation expert, and also citing the 
fairness opinion of the seller's financial advisor, which "had mid-range synergy assumptions of 
15%-20% for the synergy value that would be shared" with the seller.403  
In the Highfields case, Vice Chancellor Lamb gave 75% weight to a deal-price-less-synergies 
metric.404  The transaction price was $31 per share. The respondent's expert opined that the 
deal price incorporated shared synergies equal to 25% of the deal price, or $7.75 per share. The 
court rejected this estimate because it relied, in part, on a discounted cash flow analysis that the 
expert had declined to rely on when rendering his other valuation opinions. The court found 
more credible an analysis prepared by the acquirer, which estimated the lower end of shared 
synergies at $9.54 per share. Vice Chancellor Lamb regarded this estimate as too high, because it 
undervalued the acquired company in certain respects. After correcting the acquirer's estimate to 
account for the undervaluation, Vice Chancellor Lamb concluded that the deal price incorporated 
synergies of $4.12 per share.405  That figure worked out to a deduction [*86]  of 13%, the same 
number used in Union Illinois. 
In this case, the HP deal team anticipated $1.41 billion of synergies. McKinsey projected $1.555 
billion in synergies. Barclays' figure was $1.5 billion.406  McKinsey was an outside consulting 
firm hired to vet the HP deal team's calculation, adding some credence to its view. This decision 
therefore uses McKinsey's figure.407  Aruba's expert drew on a March 2013 study by the 
Boston Consulting Group which suggested that, on average, sellers collect 31% of the capitalized 
value of synergies, with the seller's share varying widely from 6% to 51%.408  Using these 
figures, the range of synergy value shared in the deal could run from $93 million at the low end 
to $793 million at the high end. The deal price implied a value for Aruba of $2.651 billion.409  
Using the low-end synergy deduction of $93 million implies a standalone value of $2.558 billion, 
or $21.08 per share. Using the high-end synergy deduction of $793 million implies a standalone 
value of $1.858 billion, or $15.32 per share. The midpoint is a standalone value of $2.208 billion 
or $18.20 per share. Recognizing that it would be arbitrary to import the 13% synergy figure 
used in both Union Illinois [*87]  and Highfields, that percentage nevertheless implies a 
standalone value of $2.306 billion or $19.06 per share. 
Because I am inclined to think that Aruba's representatives bargained less effectively than they 
might have, I tend to think that they obtained a relatively low share of the synergies from HP. 
This would indicate that they obtained fewer synergies than the midpoint range and imply a 
standalone value north of $18.20 per share. Having no way to gauge the marginal impact of their 




C. The Experts' Analyses 
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Both sides submitted opinions from valuation experts. Both experts used the discounted cash 
flow methodology to value Aruba. Both experts believed that the discounted cash flow 
methodology provided the best approach for determining the fair value of the Company. The 
respondent's expert, Kevin Dages, said so explicitly: "It is my opinion that Aruba's standalone 
fair value is most accurately measured using a [discounted cash flow] analysis based on the 
Management Projections."410  The petitioners' expert, Paul Marcus, expressed his view 
implicitly by relying exclusively [*88]  on the discounted cash flow approach.411  
HN13  The discounted cash flow methodology is a valuation technique that the financial 
community generally accepts and that this court frequently uses in appraisal proceedings.412  
"While the particular assumptions underlying its application may always be challenged in any 
particular case, the validity of [the discounted cash flow] technique qua valuation methodology is 
no longer open to question."413  It is a "standard" method that "gives life to the finance 
principle that firms should be valued based on the expected value of their future cash flows, 
discounted to present value in a manner that accounts for risk."414  
The DCF model entails three basic components: an estimation of net cash flows that the firm will 
generate and when, over some period; a terminal or residual value equal to the future value, as of 
the end of the projection period, of the firm's cash flows beyond the projection period; and 
finally a cost of capital with which to discount to a present value both the projected net cash 
flows and the estimated terminal or residual value.415  
The Delaware Supreme Court has recently cautioned that "[a]lthough widely considered the best 
tool for valuing [*89]  companies when there is no credible market information and no market 
check, [discounted cash flow] valuations involve many inputs—all subject to disagreement by 
well-compensated and highly credentialed experts—and even slight differences in these inputs 
can produce large valuation gaps."416  
 
 
1. Marcus's Valuation Opinion 
Marcus used a discounted cash flow analysis to opine that the Company's fair value at closing 
was $32.57 per share. His model generally adhered to the valuation literature and the teachings 
of the Delaware courts. From a methodological perspective, his model appears sound. 
As a source of estimated future cash flows, "Delaware law clearly prefers valuations based on 
contemporaneously prepared management projections because management ordinarily has the 
best first-hand knowledge of a company's operations."417  Marcus used the February 
Projections, which covered the fiscal years 2015-2017. The February Projections had their roots 
in management's three-year plan, prepared in the ordinary course of business and with input from 
the Aruba Board.418  Management completed an iteration of its three-year plan in 
summer [*90]  2014.419  Management updated the plan in October 2014.420  In February 
2015, management revised the plan to reflect intervening results and to adopt more conservative 
assumptions.421  To cover the final two years of his projection period, Marcus used an 
extension of the February Projections that Qatalyst prepared working in conjunction with Aruba 
management.422  Qatalyst used the same projections as the basis for the fairness opinion that it 
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delivered to the Aruba Board.423  Aruba also used the same projections in the proxy statement 
for the deal.424  Marcus adopted management's estimates for the cost of stock-based 
compensation425  and Aruba's tax rates.426  
The projections resulted in Aruba having a high compound annual growth rate ("CAGR") of 
10% at the end of the projection period. To normalize Aruba's high growth and transition the 
Company into a steady state, Marcus added a second, five-year stage to create a three-step 
discounted cash flow model. During the added second stage, he stepped down the growth rate to 
reach his terminal, third-stage growth rate of 3.5% per year.427  Delaware decisions and the 
valuation literature [*91]  support this approach.428  Like Marcus, HP used a three-stage 
discounted cash flow method when valuing Aruba.429  
Marcus calculated Aruba's weighted average cost of capital ("WACC") using the capital asset 
pricing model ("CAPM").430  "Under CAPM, the cost of equity capital is the risk-free rate of 
return plus the subject company's risk. The subject company's risk is determined by multiplying 
the equity risk premium for the market by the company's beta."431  Marcus used a risk-free rate 
of 2.75%, based on the twenty-year U.S. Treasury maturity rate, and a supply-side equity risk 
premium of 6.19%.432  Marcus drew these figures from reliable sources, and Dages used the 
same risk-free rate and a virtually identical supply-side equity risk premium.433  Marcus 
calculated a beta for Aruba of 0.91, which he derived by giving one-third weight to Aruba's two-
year, weekly, raw beta (0.81) and two-thirds weight to the two-year, weekly, raw, unlevered 
betas of a group of peer companies (1.11).434  Court of Chancery precedent supports the 
blended approach,435  and the valuation literature supports the selection of a two-year period 
for Aruba.436  He then [*92]  added the fifth-decline size premium.437  These calculations 
resulted in a 10% WACC.438  
To calculate value for the terminal period, Marcus used the Gordon Growth Model.439  "To 
calculate terminal value using the Gordon Growth Model, the Court must select a long-term 
growth rate, i.e., the expected growth rate of free cash flows into perpetuity."440  As noted, 
Marcus selected a perpetuity growth rate of 3.5%. He believed it was reasonable to assume that 
Aruba would grow at the rate of the overall economy, but to be conservative he selected a growth 
rate approximately at the midpoint of the risk-free rate (2.75%) and nominal GDP growth rate, as 
predicted by reliable, oft-cited studies (4.3%).441  
Marcus sensitized his valuation for discount rates of 9.5% to 10.5% and terminal growth rates of 
3.0% to 4.0%, generating a valuation range for $29.16 to $36.93. The midpoint, based on a 
discount rate of 10% and a terminal growth rate of 3.5%, was $32.57.442  
My primary concerns with Marcus's opinion are his beta and the contrast between [*93]  his 
valuation and market indicators. Marcus's raw and blended betas were both lower than one, 
indicating that Aruba, a relatively young and growing technology company, exhibited less 
volatility than the market as a whole.443  Although the data supported the low beta, no one 
could offer a good explanation as to why the number was so low.444  Marcus's beta of 0.91 also 
fell roughly 20% below the median two-year adjusted beta of companies in Aruba's peer group 
and approximately 35% below Aruba's five-year adjusted weekly beta.445  That said, Aruba's 
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low beta was not unique. The bankers' fairness presentations identified other networking and 
WiFi companies that had betas of less than 1.446  
Marcus's valuation outcome diverged significantly from market indications. His valuation of 
$32.57 is 
• approximately 32% higher than the deal price of $24.67; 
• approximately 39% higher than the mean of the last batch of unaffected analyst price targets at 
$23.4;447  
• approximately 21% above the mean of the midpoints of the final valuations prepared by all 
three advisors at $26.57;448  and 
• nearly double Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price of $17.13 per share. 
Despite its seemingly [*94]  sound methodology, these market indicators combine to create 




2. Dages's Valuation Opinion 
Dages rendered several different valuation opinions. They produced relatively stable outputs but 
changed substantially in their inputs. Dages also made a significant judgment call by selecting a 
WACC from a menu of possibilities, rather than calculating a beta to generate a WACC as 
contemplated by CAPM. 
In his opening report, Dages opined that the standalone fair value of Aruba was $19.85 per share, 
which he derived using a discounted cash flow methodology.449  Like Marcus, Dages used the 
February Projections with the two-year extension prepared by Qatalyst with management's 
input.450  Unlike Marcus, who used management estimates for stock-based compensation and 
tax rates, Dages used a stock-based compensation figure from Barclays,451  and his own 
estimate of Aruba's effective tax rate.452  Despite recognizing the issue raised by Aruba's high 
growth rate at the end of the projection period,453  Dages used a traditional two-stage model 
rather than a three-stage model. For his terminal value, Dages explained [*95]  the principles 
used when selecting a long-term growth rate in much the same terms as Marcus,454  but then 
chose the risk-free rate (2.75%) because "some financial economists caution that the risk-free 
rate . . . should serve as the ceiling for a stable, longterm growth rate" and this court had used 
that rate in "a recent opinion."455  
For his discount rate, Dages started out using CAPM to develop a WACC. He used the same 
risk-free rate as Marcus (2.75%)456  and a supply-side equity risk premium that was 
substantially similar to Marcus's (6.21%).457  On the issues of a beta and size premium, 
however, Dages punted. He described a variety of possible betas, including (i) raw and adjusted 
betas for Aruba derived using two years of weekly measurements, five years of weekly 
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measurements, and five years of monthly measurements, and (ii) raw and adjusted betas for peer 
companies derived using the same measuring periods.458  Rather than selecting a beta, Dages 
used the various candidates to generate nine possible WACCs. He then added into the mix the 
WACCs used by the three financial advisors and WACCs from two analysts, for a total [*96]  of 
fourteen possibilities.459  After surveying these, he chose a WACC of 11%.460  His WACC 
implied a beta of 1.33.461  This court has criticized similarly unstructured approaches to 
valuation inputs.462  
After I issued an evidentiary ruling precluding Dages from rendering an opinion on stock-based 
compensation, Dages changed course and relied at trial on a set of projections that he had created 
himself using industry growth rates and referenced in a footnote in his opening report.463  
When he ran his discounted cash flow model with those projections and management's figures 
for stock-based compensation expense, his model generated a value of $19.45 per share, forty 
cents below his original opinion. At trial, Dages revised his view on Aruba's tax expenses and 
agreed with management's use of a 4% tax rate for 2015 and 2016, although he continued to 
endorse the use of a 30% tax rate for subsequent years rather than management's rate of 25%.464
 This modification added thirty cents per share to his valuation, resulting in a figure of $19.75 
per share. Serendipitously, that result fell just ten cents below the valuation in his opening report, 
although reached using substantially different [*97]  inputs. This is the fair value figure that 
Aruba endorsed at post-trial argument. 
Dages's final opinion of $19.75 per share comported with market evidence by falling between the 
unaffected market price and the deal price. Its methodological underpinnings, however, provided 
cause for concern, as did the meandering route by which Dages arrived at this figure. 
 
 
D. Weighing the Valuation Methodologies 
This decision has discussed each of the relevant methods of valuation that the parties presented. 
HN14  Under the statute, the court must make a point estimate of fair value measured in dollars 
and cents. When determining fair value, "[t]he Court of Chancery must exercise its considerable 
discretion while also explaining, with reference to the economic facts before it and corporate 
finance principles, why it is according a certain weight to a certain indicator of value."465  
The forceful discussion of the efficient capital markets hypothesis in Dell and DFC indicates that 
Aruba's unaffected market price is entitled to substantial weight. 
[C]orporate finance theory reflects a belief that if an asset—such as the value of a company as 
reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to [*98]  close examination and bidding 
by many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the resulting collective 
judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative . . . .466  
HN15  "Market prices are typically viewed superior to other valuation techniques because, 
unlike, e.g., a single person's discounted cash flow model, the market price should distill the 
collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly available information about a given 
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company and the value of its shares."467  "[I]n many circumstances a property interest is best 
valued by the amount a buyer will pay for it" and "a well-informed, liquid trading market will 
provide a measure of fair value superior to any estimate the court could impose."468  
In this case, because Aruba's shares "were widely traded on a public market based upon a rich 
information basis," the fair value of the petitioners' shares "would, to an economist, likely be best 
reflected by the prices at which their shares were trading as of the merger."469  Aruba had "a 
deep base of public shareholders" and "highly active trading," so "the price at which its shares 
trade is informative of fair value."470  The [*99]  unaffected thirty-day average market price of 
Aruba's stock was $17.13 per share. 
Dell and DFC teach that the deal price is also entitled to substantial weight. "In economics, the 
value of something is what it will fetch in the market. That is true of corporations, just as it is 
true of gold."471  For a court to give weight to the deal price, it need not be the most reliable 
evidence of the Company's value as a going concern.472  This court has authority "to determine, 
in its discretion, that the deal price is the most reliable evidence of fair value . . . , and that's 
especially so in cases . . . where things like synergy gains or minority stockholder discounts are 
not contested."473  
The deal price in this case resulted from an arm's-length transaction involving a publicly traded 
company without a controlling stockholder. The deal price in this case contained synergies, so it 
logically exceeded fair value. There is also the fact that the petitioners failed to identify a bidder 
who would pay more than HP. "Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to 
pay . . . ."474  Taken together, these propositions indicate that the deal price in this case 
operates as a ceiling for fair [*100]  value. 
The Dell and DFC decisions recognize that a deal price may include synergies and endorse 
deriving an indication of fair value from the deal price by deducting synergies.475  In this case, 
the evidence shows that the deal generated significant synergies. Using the low-end synergy 
range implies a standalone value of $21.08 per share. Using the high-end synergy range implies a 
standalone value of $15.32 per share. This decision has adopted the midpoint of $18.20 per share 
as its deal-price-less-synergies value. 
This decision does not give any weight to the discounted cash flow analyses. As in Dell, "this 
appraisal case does not present the classic scenario in which there is reason to suspect that 
market forces cannot be relied upon to ensure fair treatment of the minority."476  Discounted 
cash flow models are "often used in appraisal proceedings when the respondent company was 
not public or was not sold in an open market check."477  
The reason for that is not that an economist wouldn't consider the best estimate of a private 
company's value to be the price it sold at in an open sale process of which all logical buyers were 
given full information and an equal opportunity to compete. Rather, the [*101]  reason is that if 
such a process did not occur, corporate finance instructs that the value of the company to 
potential buyers should be reflected in its ability to generate future cash flows.478  
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"But, a single person's own estimate of the cash flows are just that, a good faith estimate by a 
single, reasonably informed person to predict the future. Thus, a singular discounted cash flow 
model is often most helpful when there isn't an observable market price."479  When market 
evidence is available, "the Court of Chancery should be chary about imposing the hazards that 
always come when a law-trained judge is forced to make a point estimate of fair value based on 
widely divergent partisan expert testimony."480  
Marcus's discounted cash flow valuation of $32.57 per share diverged substantially from market 
indications. His figure is nearly double Aruba's thirty-day average unaffected market price of 
$17.13. It is approximately 32% higher than the deal price of $24.67 per share. In a transaction 
involving a financial buyer that could be expected to generate few if any combinatorial 
synergies, the Delaware Supreme Court recently emphasized the lack of reliability of a 
discounted cash flow analysis that [*102]  yielded a result that was 40% over the deal price.481  
The transaction in this case generated substantial synergies. 
Dages's initial discounted cash flow valuation of $19.85 and revised discounted cash flow 
valuation of $19.75 fell nicely between the unaffected market price and the deal price. His 
figures also landed close to HP's standalone discounted cash flow valuation of $18.98 and 
Barclay's standalone discounted cash flow valuation of $19.93. The relative lack of 
methodological rigor in the analysis, however, creates cause for concern about the strategic 
selection of inputs to channel the result into this range. 
The two probative indications of value in this case are the unaffected market price of $17.13 and 
the deal-price-less-synergies value of approximately $18.20 per share. Using these indicators 
nevertheless carries conceptual difficulties because HN16  "[t]he time for determining the value 
of a dissenter's shares is the point just before the merger transaction 'on the date of the 
merger.'"482  If the value of the corporation changes between the signing of the merger and the 
closing, the fair value determination must be measured by the "operative reality" of the 
corporation at the effective [*103]  time of the merger.483  
The unaffected market price provides direct evidence of the collective view of market 
participants as to Aruba's fair value as a going concern during the period before the 
announcement of the transaction, which could be different than Aruba's fair value as of closing. 
The same disconnect exists for the deal price, which provides evidence of how the parties to the 
merger agreement valued Aruba during the price negotiations, which could be different than 
Aruba's fair value as of closing. Addressing a similar issue in the Union Illinois case, Chief 
Justice Strine described the temporal gap as a "quibble" and "not a forceful objection," noting 
that "[t]he negotiation of merger terms always and necessarily precedes consummation."484  
Observing that "[n]othing in the record persuades me that [the company] was more valuable by 
[closing] than it was when the Merger terms were set," he continued to use the deal price as an 
indicator of value.485  Similarly in this case, neither side proved that Aruba's value had changed 
materially by closing, so this decision sticks with the unaffected market price and the deal price 
less synergies. 
The difficult question is how to choose between, [*104]  weigh, or otherwise exercise my 
discretion non-abusively when evaluating the two probative valuation indications. The 
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unaffected market price provides a direct measure of the collective judgment of numerous 
market participants about Aruba's value as a going concern. The deal price less synergies 
provides an indirect measure with two significant sources of uncertainty. One is the problem of 
measurement error. Under the traditional view of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, errors 
are randomly distributed and cancel out.486  My deal-price-less-synergies figure could have 
errors at multiple levels. To cite just a few, I may have erred when making my case-specific 
allocation of synergies to the sell-side. I might have misinterpreted the information that Aruba's 
expert cited, or that data itself could contain sampling and measurement errors. The size of the 
original synergy estimates might also be off, as could any number of individual estimates that 
added up to the overarching estimates. After all, they were necessarily predictions about complex 
matters. Perhaps errors at one level might counterbalance errors at another, but there is no way to 
know, and the smaller number of judgments [*105]  involved (compared to the number of trades 
generating the market price) makes it more likely that the errors could skew the figure, just like a 
small and undiversified portfolio can produce extreme results. The Delaware Supreme Court's 
expressed preference in Dell and DFC for market indicators over discounted cash flow 
valuations counsels in favor of preferring market indicators over the output of a similarly 
judgment-laden exercise of backing out synergies.487  
The other difficulty is that my deal-price-less-synergies figure continues to incorporate an 
element of value resulting from the merger. HN17  When an acquirer purchases a widely traded 
firm, the premium that an acquirer is willing to pay for the entire firm anticipates incremental 
value both from synergies and from the reduced agency costs that result from unitary (or 
controlling) ownership.488  Like synergies, the value created by reduced agency costs results 
from the transaction and is not part of the going concern value of the firm.489  The value 
belongs to the buyer, although the seller may extract a portion of it through negotiations.490  
Eliminating shared synergies therefore only goes part of the [*106]  way towards eliminating 
"any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger."491  A 
court also must eliminate the share of value that accrues from the reduced agency costs.492  
For Aruba, using its unaffected market price provides the more straightforward and reliable 
method for estimating the value of the entity as a going concern. I could strive to reach the same 
endpoint by backing out shared synergies and a share of value for reduced agency costs, but both 
steps are messy and provide ample opportunities for error. For Aruba, the unaffected market 
price provides a direct estimate of the same endpoint.493  Rather than representing my own 
fallible determination, it distills "the collective judgment of the many based on all the publicly 
available information about a given company and the value of its shares."494  "[T]he price 
produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the 
view of a single analyst," particularly when a trial judge is playing the analyst's role.495  
This approach does not elevate "market value" to the governing standard under the appraisal 
statute. The governing standard for fair [*107]  value under the appraisal statute remains the 
entity's value as a going concern. For Aruba, the unaffected public market price provides the best 
evidence of its value as a going concern. 
In this case, the best evidence of Aruba's fair value as a going concern, exclusive of any value 
derived from the merger, is its thirty-day average unaffected market price of $17.13 per share. I 
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recognize that no one argued for this result. I also recognize that the resulting award is lower 
than Aruba's proposed figure of $19.75 per share. That figure relied on its expert's discounted 
cash flow analysis, which this decision has found unpersuasive. 
HN18  "When . . . none of the parties establishes a value that is persuasive, the Court must 
make a determination based on its own analysis."496  The appraisal statute requires that "the 
Court shall determine the fair value of the shares."497  This means that I must reach my own, 




The petitioners are awarded $17.13 per share. The legal rate of interest, compounded quarterly, 
shall accrue on this amount from the date of closing until the date of payment. 
The [*108]  parties shall cooperate in preparing a final order. If the parties identify additional 
issues that need to be resolved, they shall submit a joint letter within two weeks that explains the 
issues and recommends a schedule for bringing this case to conclusion, at least at the trial court 
level. 
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front of it" and that "[s]tarting with a 3 [in front] would be unrealistic") 
• 75  
PTO ¶ 42; JX 305 at 2-3 (signed engagement letter). 
• 76  
See JX 308 (talking points for Orr including, "we are not trying to sell the company and 
both the management team and the board are very bullish about our prospects as an 
independent company," "a combination could be very powerful," and "the price would 
have to be very compelling to take us off our current path which we know will result in 
significant shareholder value"). 
• 77  
See JX 310 at 1-2 (internal HP email summarizing conversation between Orr and Neri, 
stating Aruba "would like to have a deeper conversation around how serious we are and 
our willingness to execute the plan/synergies," and requesting a write-up on "why 
[Aruba]+HP is better" and "[o]ur view of the synergies"); JX 312 at 3, 5 (resulting 
writeup stressing "[w]e believe that there are meaningful revenue synergies" because 
"[c]ombined, the companies would have a leading converged campus solution" and 
significant "cross-selling" opportunities). 
• 78  
See JX 319 at 2-5 (emails coordinating meetings between Aruba and HP management); 
Proxy at 48-49. 
• 79  
JX 319 at 6 (Aruba talking points prepared for Orr: "I was frankly surprised by the 
breadth and scope of the information request, as it was not consistent with the message I 
thought you conveyed to me when we last spoke."). 
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• 80  
Id. 
• 81  
JX 229 at 1 (minutes); accord JX 327 at 3 (Qatalyst board deck). 
• 82  
JX 229 at 1-2. 
• 83  
Id. at 2; accord Proxy at 48; Warmenhoven Tr. 259 (testifying Aruba did not contact 
financial bidders because "they like steady-state businesses, cash-cow businesses, and, 
you know, something that's just this volatile doesn't fit that profile" and because "they're 
what I will refer to as bottom-feeders," describing them as "generally low-ball bidders, 
very small premiums"). 
• 84  
JX 757 at 17 (draft Qatalyst board deck). 
• 85  
JX 760 (Qatalyst "Outreach Summary"); see Warmenhoven Tr. 256-58, 329-31 
(describing outreach); Orr Tr. 440-42 (same). 
• 86  
JX 760 at 2 (chart showing status of each investor as "Declined to Proceed"); Proxy at 
48-49. 
• 87  
Boutros Dep. 219; accord Warmenhoven Tr. 260 ("[I]t was definitive noninterest."); id. 
329-30 (agreeing potential bidders provided "feedback" that they "had no strategic 
interest in acquiring Aruba" and that it "[h]ad nothing to do with the price"). 
• 88  
JX 341 at 1. 




• 90  
See Warmenhoven Tr. 219-20; id. at 313-14 (confirming Galvin prepared the June Plan 
"in the spring of 2014, as part of the normal operations" of the Company); Galvin Tr. 
553-54 (discussing development of "top-down" projections incorporating "broader 
strategic assumptions" discussed by the Aruba Board regularly at the "June meeting"). 
See generally PTO ¶¶ 110-14. 
• 91  
See JX 297 at 2 (email from Galvin to member of the finance team: "I think we need to 
make this more conservative than the 3 [year] plan."); see also Warmenhoven Tr. 314-15 
(discussing Aruba's ordinary process of preparing a yearly operating plan in September); 
Galvin Tr. 586 (acknowledging September figures adjusted margins, reflecting "[t]he 
overall impacts" of Project Greyhound). 
• 92  
JX 315 at 1 (email from Galvin to Qatalyst banker). 
• 93  
Proxy at 64; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 315; Galvin Tr. 587. 
• 94  
JX 342 at 4 (internal Qatalyst emails attaching draft discounted cash flow model). 
• 95  
JX 345 at 20. 
• 96  
Id. at 15-16. 
• 97  
Id. at 20. 
• 98  
JX 348 (email from Neri to Whitman). 
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• 99  
Johansson Dep. 112. 
• 100  
JX 349 at 1. 
• 101  
Id.; see also Orr Tr. 462-66 (confirming solicitation and that "part of the reason they are 
willing to pay a premium for the Aruba price is for my leadership"). 
• 102  
JX 3 § 8. 
• 103  
Orr Tr. 463-64 (agreeing Aruba Board had not authorized discussion). 
• 104  
JX 350 at 4 (internal deck prepared for presentation to Whitman). 
• 105  
Id. at 14-15. 
• 106  
Id. at 20. 
• 107  
JX 356 (internal deck prepared for HP Board subcommittee). See 
generally [*20]  Johansson Dep. 22-24 (discussing HP approval process). 
• 108  
JX 638 at 3 (transcript from Aruba earnings call). 
• 109  
Id. at 4. 
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• 110  
JX 363 (internal HP email transmitting Barclays analyst report). 
• 111  
JX 638 at 13 (Galvin stating Aruba was "just being prudent in a mixed environment" and 
"[n]ot getting ahead of our skis"); see also JX 355 at 1 (email from Galvin to Aruba 
Board: "our guide is shaping up to be more cautious than our strong results"). 
• 112  
JX 245. 
• 113  
See JX 357 at 1 (internal email among members of the HP deal team: "They are down 8% 
after hours though because of guidance below consensus for this quarter (although it 
looks like the range of guidance is still within expectations). Good time to pull the trigger 
and snap them up I would say."); Hardegree Dep. 193 (observing that the stock price drop 
"probably did, on balance" put HP "in a more tacti[cally] advantaged position"). 
• 114  
JX 362 at 1. 
• 115  
JX 357 at 1 (Neri: "We told our story and we were on point."); see also JX 360 (email 
from HP Senior Vice President of Corporate Development: "I thought the results were 
pretty good. . . . They blew past the revenue expectations for the quarter. But they guided 
soft, below consensus."). 
• 116  
JX 780 at 2 (internal HP deck discussing November earnings announcement). 
• 117  
JX 328 (email from Orr to Aruba Board reporting that "Antonio [Neri] said that [HP] 
needs another 2-3 weeks to address the board's questions"). 
• 118  
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Id. ("We have been in dialogue with [HP] since August 27, and have not received a 
proposal in all this time. . . . We cannot continue to wait for them."); accord Proxy at 48-
49 
• 119  
JX 372 at 1 (email from Aruba General Counsel relaying conversation with Johansson 
during which she explained that "[w]e feel it's time to suspend discussions" because "it 
has reached a point where we need to focus on running our business and not be distracted 
by discussions that did not seem to be progressing"); see also Orr Tr. 448-49 ("So we are 
basically saying, if you cannot get it done, let's cool off. And when you are ready, contact 
me again."). 
• 120  
See JX 328; JX 367 (email from Aruba to Qatalyst advising it had "decided to terminate 
discussions with [HP] at this time" and that it would "let [Qatalyst] know if discussions 
resume"). 
• 121  
JX 383 at 1, 3 (McKinsey report projecting "share gains in line with what is in the 
business case (2.6-3.1% share gain in wired vs. 3% in the business case and 
correspondingly 4.3-5.6% share gain in wireless vs. 7% in the business case)"). 
• 122  
See JX 387 (internal Barclays email dated December 19: "HP wants to have our views on 
value on Monday"); JX 389 (email from Barclays to HP on December 22 providing "the 
deck we plan to review on our 10am conference call"). 
• 123  
See PTO ¶¶ 51, 54; JX 224 (Aruba Board subcommittee minutes); Galvin Tr. 601. 
Evercore was also advising in connection with the potential debt financing. See JX 286 
(email from Francis to Orr and Galvin discussing fiscal year 2014 results ahead of 
"meeting on the convertible market"). 
• 124  
JX 325 at 1 (email from Galvin relaying conversation wherein he told Barclays banker 
Aruba would not be executing the convertible offering and banker responded "in my 
business, when this happens, either an exec is leaving the company or a major M&A 
[transaction] is in process"). 
• 125  
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See, e.g., JX 335 at 2 (email from Barclays banker to Aruba management: "[W]e're 
hearing (from non-Aruba sources) that HP has reinitiated dialogue with you" and "[w]e 
want to be as helpful as we can."); id. at 1 (describing phone call in which Barclays 
banker reminded Orr that "we helped you with the Barclay IT people, we walked away 
from [the] Ruckus IPO when Galvin said it was competitive . . . , [and] we have done a 
lot [o]f work to support you in the last 8 years"); id. (banker telling Orr that Barclays 
"would be disappointed if the HP rumor is true and you do not work with us"); JX 384 
(email between Barclays bankers: "I am trying to get back in front of the Aruba team. 
Seems like we have given up on the HP side."). 
• 126  
PTO ¶ 53; JX 227 (minutes). See generally Galvin Tr. 594-96 (discussing share 
repurchase program). 
• 127  
JX 226 at 1-2 (minutes). 
• 128  
PTO ¶ 133. 
• 129  
See id. ¶ 136. 
• 130  
JX 328. 
• 131  
See JX 373 at 1 (internal Aruba emails discussing share repurchase program); see also 
Orr Tr. 448 (testifying that, in breaking off discussions, he considered that "[w]e have a 
stock buy-back program that . . . we have to resume"); Galvin Tr. 595-96 (discussing the 
share repurchase and stating "[w]e had a standard set of language that, when we 
approached these things, that it may be depressed, it may be undervalued"). 
• 132  
JX 389 at 16-17 (Barclays deck). 
• 133  
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Orr Tr. 454 (comparing analysts to "somebody [who] has decided to get out of a 
relationship" because "the other party can learn how to cook, clean the floor, you know, 
be available on the weekend, and so on. Something is always wrong."); see also JX 406 at 
1 (email from Orr: "we simply cannot miss Q2 and have the stock tanked further, risking 
employee morale and retention getting into an unrepairable state"). 
• 134  
JX 378 at 2 (email among Aruba executives). 
• 135  
JX 374 at 1 (email from Jason Adler, analyst at William Blair & Company). 
• 136  
See JX 377 (email from Galvin recapping meeting). 
• 137  
PTO ¶ 154; JX 392 (correspondence between Orr and Neri scheduling dinner). 
• 138  
PTO ¶ 155. 
• 139  
JX 423 (email from Orr relaying conversation to Aruba management); see also Orr Tr. 
524-25. 
• 140  
JX 423; see also Orr Tr. 527 ("We're saying that let's use this as a forcing function."). 
• 141  
JX 412 at 1. Warmenhoven disputed at trial whether he correctly understood Orr to be 
saying that Whitman felt that Qatalyst, rather than Autonomy, was guilty. His deposition 
transcript indicates that his counsel planted this idea. See Warmenhoven Tr. 336-40; 
Warmenhoven Dep. 141-43 ("[Aruba counsel]: If you are going to move off of this, 
would you mind if I clarify one point? [Verition counsel]: Okay, that's fine. [Aruba 
counsel]: Mr. Warmenhoven, if you don't mind my interjecting -- The Witness: No, I 
know where you're going. . . . That's how I interpreted it at that time. That's not right. 
Meg [Whitman's] conviction was that Autonomy was guilty -- not Qatalyst -- that 
Autonomy was guilty of fraud."). Aruba's counsel should not have influenced the 
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substance of Warmenhoven's testimony during his deposition. Nor should counsel have 
been reshaping Warmenhoven's recollection of the facts. 
• 142  
JX 412 at 1; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 247-49 (discussing JX 412); Orr Tr. 449-51 
(same). 
• 143  
JX 412 at 1. 
• 144  
Id.; accord Warmenhoven Tr. 249-51; Orr Tr. 451 ("Obviously, the top of mind is the 
person that I started out with, and that has been a trusted advisor to the company and to 
me, and that was Stu [Francis]."). 
• 145  
JX 413. 
• 146  
Id.; accord JX 414 (email from Orr to Warmenhoven: "I think Qatalyst will not be willing 
to carve out fees for Stu [Francis]."); JX 426 at 2 (internal Aruba email summarizing 
discussions with Francis concerning fees: "He started at Evercore 5 months ago and is 
their first tech sector person. They want this deal to establish a presence in tech."); see 
also PTO ¶ 46 ("J. Stuart Francis is a Senior Managing Director of Evercore. Mr. Francis 
joined Evercore in the summer of 2014."). 
• 147  
JX 420 (email from Warmenhoven recounting discussion to Aruba Board and 
management). 
• 148  
Id. 
• 149  
Id.; accord Warmenhoven Tr. 252-53 (Whitman told Warmenhoven "I don't care who 
you get, but it can't be Qatalyst" and that "I'm not going to take into my boardroom a deal 
proposed by Qatalyst"); id. at 341-45; Orr Tr. 530. 
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• 150  
JX 432 at 1 (email among Aruba management discussing negotiation of Qatalyst's fees). 
• 151  
JX 422 at 1 (email among Evercore senior bankers). 
• 152  
JX 427. 
• 153  
Id. 
• 154  
JX 428; accord JX 439 (congratulatory emails from two additional senior bankers). 
• 155  
JX 426 (email from Orr to Aruba management updating on negotiations with Qatalyst). 
Orr expressed his opinion that Boutros "reacted so strongly cause (1) pride of their brand 
(2) reaction to Stu [Francis] coming in[to] the picture [and] (3) protecting their fees." Id. 
He noted that "[n]one of the above related to the benefits of [A]ruba!" Id. 
• 156  
JX 430. 
• 157  
JX 434 at 1. 
• 158  
JX 436 at 1. See generally Warmenhoven Tr. 344-45 (recounting process of attempting to 
ingratiate Qatalyst with HP). 
• 159  
JX 437 at 1; see also JX 438 (Quattrone sending Warmenhoven what he described as a 
cordial rejection by Whitman of a social invitation as evidence that she had no bias 
against Qatalyst and was bluffing to gain leverage in the negotiations). 
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• 160  
JX 440 at 1 (email from Orr to Aruba management). 
• 161  
JX 447 at 1 (email from Whitman to Quattrone dated January 28, 2015: "Will call you 
tomorrow."). 
• 162  
Whitman Dep. 127-28. 
• 163  
PTO ¶ 47; see also JX 5 (executed engagement letter); JX 232 (Aruba Board minutes 
authorizing Evercore engagement). 
• 164  
JX 398 at 1-2 (cover email for internal deck seeking HP Board approval); JX 805 at 12 
(internal HP deck). 
• 165  
JX 455 at 1 (email from Orr to Aruba management and Qatalyst recounting call). 
• 166  
JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing Johansson's relay of the call). 
• 167  
Id. 
• 168  
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal"). 
• 169  
Id. at 3-4. 
• 170  
JX 782 at 4 (Barclays deck). 
71 
 
• 171  
Id. 
• 172  
JX 461 at 2 (internal Evercore email relaying what Aruba's General Counsel anticipated 
to be the timeline of events). 
• 173  
JX 233 (minutes); JX 910 at 3 (Aruba 8-K comparing October Projections and February 
Projections); Galvin Tr. 558-63 (discussing process of extending ordinary course six-
month budgeting projections out to three years to create February Projections). 
• 174  
Proxy at 51. 
• 175  
JX 466 at 1-2 (internal Aruba email distributing report). 
• 176  
Id. at 1. 
• 177  
Id. 
• 178  
JX 470 at 1 (email from Francis to other Evercore bankers: "I am thinking about the 
analyst downgrades and if there [is] anything we can do."). 
• 179  
Id. 
• 180  
JX 794 at 14 (Evercore deck). 
• 181  
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JX 234 (minutes); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 261 (testifying the Aruba Board came to the 
figure because "[w]e wanted to reaffirm that we thought there was great value there, 
meaning they should bid higher, but we felt like if we put a 3 in the first digit and started 
at 30, that they might conclude that's too big a gap to close and stop discussion"). 
• 182  
JX 477 at 1 (Barclays email relaying counteroffer to HP). 
• 183  
Id. 
• 184  
Id. 
• 185  
JX 484 at 1. 
• 186  
Id. 
• 187  
Proxy at 51. 
• 188  
JX 491 (email from Barclays to HP recounting exchange). 
• 189  
Id. Ubiquiti announced financial results on February 5, 2015 that beat the consensus 
estimates, and its stock rose by 14%. See JX 639 (Ubiquiti earnings transcript); JX 902 
(Ubiquiti 8-K announcing results). 
• 190  
JX 491; accord JX 488 at 4 (internal Evercore emails confirming change in shares 
outstanding and suggesting repurchases caused the change). 
• 191  
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JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer 
Price"). 
• 192  
Id. 
• 193  
JX 497 (internal HP email from Johansson); accord JX 805 at 12 (timeline showing 
"02/08 — HP offer $24.00 and present as best and final. [Aruba] provide new shares 
outstanding and cash information supporting paying $24.67 at the same enterprise 
value."). 
• 194  
Proxy at 52. 
• 195  
Id.; accord JX 494 at 2 (email from Neri to Whitman summarizing conversation). 
• 196  
JX 496 at 1 (email from Francis to Aruba management transmitting revised proposal: 
"They did not move up just as Meg [Whitman] said to you."). 
• 197  
Id. at 3. 
• 198  
Id. 
• 199  
Id. 
• 200  
JX 235 at 1-2 (minutes); accord Proxy at 52; Boutros Dep. 219-20 (describing lack of 
interest from other strategic bidders); Warmenhoven Dep. 104 (same). 
• 201  
74 
 
JX 235 at 1-2; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 265-66 (testifying prospects of standing alone 
"were looking extremely challenging" because the "core market" was "going to zero 
growth" and Aruba was experiencing difficult "market conditions" and "competitive 
positioning"). 
• 202  
JX 235 at 1-2; accord Proxy at 52; Warmenhoven Tr. 263. 
• 203  
JX 237 (minutes). 
• 204  
Id.; accord Proxy at 52. See generally Orr Tr. 466-70 (discussing negotiation of new 
employment agreement with HP). 
• 205  
JX 505 at 1 (internal Evercore email). 
• 206  
Id. 
• 207  
Id. (reproduced in full, ellipses in original); see also Reisenberg Dep. 248-54 (discussing 
JX 505). 
• 208  
JX 866 (article). 
• 209  
JX 510 (internal Qatalyst email); see also Boutros Dep. 206-07 ("[N]ow the stock is 
going to trade based on takeover speculation and no more based on fundamentals, pure 
fundamentals. There is a lot of noise."). 
• 210  
Proxy at 53. 
• 211  
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JX 152; accord JX 155 (JMP Securities report stating "[w]e believe the acquisition would 
be a logical step for HP" and anticipating "that Aruba's board would look for an 
acquisition price in the $23-$27 range"). 
• 212  
JX 514 at 1, 3 (internal Barclays email discussing results). 
• 213  
JX 156 (Macquarie Research report). 
• 214  
JX 159 (William Blair report). 
• 215  
JX 157 (Jeffries report). 
• 216  
JX 168 at 3-4 (Citi report). 
• 217  
Proxy at 53. 
• 218  
JX 517 at 3 (Qatalyst board deck). 
• 219  
Id. at 6. 
• 220  
Proxy at 53. 
• 221  
Id. 
• 222  
76 
 
JX 520 (internal Barclays email). 
• 223  
JX 806 at 14 (Barclays deck). 
• 224  
Id. at 15. 
• 225  
JX 238 at 1-3 (HP Board minutes). 
• 226  
JX 811 at 19 (Qatalyst deck). 
• 227  
JX 812 at 14 (Evercore deck). 
• 228  
Proxy at 53. 
• 229  
JX 521 at 1; see also Boutros Dep. 270 (testifying he understood Whitman to be 
amenable to "resolution of the issues she had and the feelings she had towards Qatalyst"). 
• 230  
JX 521 at 2. 
• 231  
JX 522 at 2 ("[W]e do want to have a good relationship with you, and we are willing to 
explore alternatives to our normal course of business in marketing this deal, if I can have 
your assurance that by doing so, we will have a 'clean slate' with you and HP immediately 
going forward."). 
• 232  
Id. at 3. Aruba and HP announced the merger before Whitman responded. Qatalyst held 
off on publicity efforts pending her response. On March 3, 2015, Whitman told Quattrone 
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he should "go ahead and do whatever communication feels right to you under the 
circumstances." Id. at 1-2. On March 4, Qatalyst sent out a blast announcing its role in 
the deal. JX 541 at 2. Whitman also told Quattrone that she was willing to "get together . 
. . and discuss the path forward." JX 522 at 2. The meeting eventually took place in 
October 2015. Afterwards, Quattrone sent Whitman a follow-up email which emphasized 
that he was "look[ing] forward to next steps in building a strong long-term relationship 
between our firms." JX 572 at 1-2. 
• 233  
JX 907 (8-K announcing signing). 
• 234  
Id. at 3-4, 73-78. 
• 235  
Id. at 4. 
• 236  
Proxy at 1. 
• 237  
See 8 Del. C. § 251. 
• 238  
Aruba Networks, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (May 1, 2015). Although the parties 
did not submit this filing as an exhibit, the Delaware Supreme Court has taken judicial 
notice of public filings in an appraisal case and relied on them for the truth of their 
contents. See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 351 n.7. 
• 239  
JX 914 at 2 (8-K announcing closing). 
• 240  
See PTO ¶¶ 11, 17. 
• 241  
Dkt. 56 at 11-13 (motion opening brief). 
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• 242  
Dkt. 65. 
• 243  
See Dkt. 125 (transcript and rulings on motion to strike). 
• 244  
See Dkt. 153 (transcript and rulings on renewed motion to strike). 
• 245  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *1. 
• 246  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71. 
• 247  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. 
• 248  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *13 (quoting Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 
1137, 1142-43 (Del. 1989)). 
• 249  
Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144). 
• 250  
Id. (quoting Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144). 
• 251  
Glob. GT LP v. Golden Telecom, Inc. (Golden Telecom Trial), 993 A.2d 497, 507 (Del. 
Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.), aff'd, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010); accord DFC, 172 A.3d at 368 
("[B]y valuing the company on its value as a 'going concern,' the [Delaware Supreme] 
Court [in Cavalier Oil] seemed to require the excision of any value that might be 
attributable to expected synergies by a buyer."); M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 
790, 797 (Del. 1999) ("[S]ection 262(h) requires that the Court of Chancery discern the 
going concern value of the company irrespective of the synergies involved in a merger."). 
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• 252  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *14. 
• 253  
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 713 (Del. 1983). 
• 254  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *15 n.105. 
• 255  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *15. 
• 256  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372. 
• 257  
By "traditional," I mean a framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis consistent 
with Eugene Fama's seminal work and its baseline Chicago-school assumptions. See 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 
J. Fin. 383 (1970). 
At the trial court level in Dell, I cited some points of entry into a significant and growing 
body of literature that raises question about the assumptions undergirding the traditional 
model, which suggest a need for greater nuance. See In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc. (Dell 
Trial Fair Value), 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *25 n.16 (Del. Ch. 
May 31, 2016), rev'd in pertinent part sub nom. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event 
Driven Master Fund Ltd,     A.3d    , 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829 (Del. Dec. 
14, 2017). In the legal field, much of this work has responded to the United States 
Supreme Court's relatively high-level framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
as the cornerstone for using the fraud-on-the-market theory to create a presumption of 
reliance in securities fraud actions. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42, 
243-44, 246, 108 S. Ct. 978, 99 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1988). The field of behavioral economics 
has yielded particularly powerful insights. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Theories, 
Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market Efficiency Revisited, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
851 (1992); Larry E. Ribstein, Fraud on a Noisy Market, 10 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 137 
(2006); Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 Or. L. Rev. 175 (2010). 
Noise trading theory and chaos theory have yielded additional insights. See, e.g., 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walks to Chaotic Crashes: The Linear 
Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, 62 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 546 
(1994); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and 
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Price Discovery, 51 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 843 (1994); Andrei Schleifer & Lawrence H. 
Summers, The Noise Trader Approach to Finance, 4 J. Econ. Persp. 19 (1990). 
Perhaps future appraisal litigants will retain experts on market efficiency, as is common 
in federal securities actions, and maybe future appraisal decisions will consider subtler 
aspects of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. This decision does not provide any 
opportunity for doing so. In its supplemental submissions on the implications of Dell and 
DFC, the petitioners alluded to potential objections to the Delaware Supreme Court's 
framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, but they did not develop those 
objections in any meaningful way. Absent a case-specific expert opinion supported by 
credible evidence and the weight of social-science research, I do not believe a trial judge 
has the flexibility to disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's framing of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis. 
• 258  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17; DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70. 
• 259  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370. 
• 260  
Id. at 369-70. 
• 261  
Id. at 367. 
• 262  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17. 
• 263  
Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). 
• 264  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1 (reversing trial court's fair value determination 
because, among other reasons, "[h]ere, the trial court gave no weight to Dell's stock price 
because it found its market to be inefficient. But the evidence suggests that the market for 
Dell's shares was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value."). 
• 265  
81 
 
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
• 266  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *3 (footnotes omitted). 
• 267  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 352. 
• 268  
Id. at 372. 
• 269  
See, e.g., Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Tr. Funds, 568 U.S. 455, 471 n.6, 133 S. Ct. 
1184, 185 L. Ed. 2d 308 (2013) (noting trial court relying on "unchallenged expert report 
. . . expressly found that the market for Amgen's stock was efficient"); IBEW Local 98 
Pension Fund v. Best Buy Co., Inc., 818 F.3d 775, 779 (8th Cir. 2016) (noting "plaintiffs 
submitted a report by their expert" to support their "motion for class certification [which] 
relied on Basic's fraud-on-the-market presumption"); Schleicher v. Wendt, 618 F.3d 679, 
682 (7th Cir. 2010) ("A financial economist concluded, in an expert report that the 
district judge credited, that the market for Conseco's shares was efficient . . . and that 
investors therefore can use the fraud-on-the-market doctrine as a replacement for person-
specific proof of reliance and causation."). See generally 7AA Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1781.1 (3d ed. 
2005). 
• 270  
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 352-53 (citing analyst reports and petitioners' and respondent's 
expert reports on valuation). 
• 271  
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 nn.9-15 (citing public filings 
with SEC and report of Dell's valuation expert). 
• 272  
See Marcus Tr. 59 (Verition's expert testifying that "the stock was trading well"); Marcus 
Dep. 198-99 (Verition's expert testifying that Aruba was "actively traded" as contrasted 
with "a company that, you know, is thinly traded" and where "there might be some 
efficiency issues"); see also Aruba Networks, Inc., Notification of Removal from Listing 
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and/or Registration Under Section 12(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Form 
25) (May 19, 2015). 
• 273  
See Marcus Opening Report Ex. 3-1 ("Summary of Analyst Price Targets"); Marcus Tr. 
59 (Verition's expert noting that "[t]here was lots of analyst coverage"); Marcus Dep. 
198-99 (Verition's expert noting that Aruba had "30 plus analysts covering them"). 
• 274  
JX 164 (BMO Capital Markets report containing trading statistics); see also Dell, 2017 
Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 n.10 (citing 5 Alan R. Bromberg et al., 
Bromberg [*52]  & Lowenfels on Securities Fraud § 7:484 (2d ed. June 2017 Update) 
("Turnover measured by average weekly trading of 2% or more of the outstanding shares 
would justify a strong presumption that the market for the security is an efficient one.")). 
• 275  
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3 (stating that Dell's spread of 
approximately 0.08% was indicative of market efficiency). 
• 276  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367-68. 
• 277  
See, e.g., JX 245; Dkt. 162 at 13 (Petitioners' Opening Post-Trial Brief containing stock 
price chart); Dkt. 188 Ex. A (publicly available stock-price data for Aruba & S&P 500). 
• 278  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *3. 
• 279  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *1; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367-68. 
• 280  
777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001). 
• 281  
See JX 47 (Barclays report); JX 48 (Janney Capital Markets report). 
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• 282  
JX 47 at 1. 
• 283  
JX 259 at 2-3 (email collecting analyst coverage). 
• 284  
See JX 260 at 5-6 (email thread among management discussing market reaction); JX 267 
(Orr reporting to the Aruba Board: "[W]e, as an executive team, are finally sick of wall st 
discrediting our tremendous come back in revenue growth because they said we are not 
as profitable as Ubiquiti (give me a break!)."); JX 269 at 2 (Orr email to Galvin: 
"Between you and me, if we do all these and our stock price stays $13-20, you and I fail 
miserably. I don't know why we are doing all these [sic] tough stuff. I really don't."); see 
also Warmenhoven Tr. 235 ("It was very frustrating for the management team, I must 
say. I mean, in -- in fiscal year 2014, they had 20 percent year-over-year growth, and we 
were delivering everything to the street, and the stock really didn't move."). 
• 285  
See JX 280 (internal Aruba deck on Project Greyhound). 
• 286  
JX 273 at 2 (draft internal talking points); see also Orr Tr. 486 (suggesting Project 
Greyhound was motivated, in part, by sense stock price "does not reflect what we believe 
is our commitment to deliver to what the analysts and the investors want us to do"); 
Galvin Tr. 597-98 (acknowledging Aruba undertook Project Greyhound, in part, because 
"we did have pressure from Wall Street to improve what we were dropping to the bottom 
line"); id. at 600 (agreeing "Greyhound was initiated because there was a perception that 
the company value was not adequately reflected in the stock price"). 
• 287  
JX 828 (press release announcing results). 
• 288  
Compare JX 59 at 2 and JX 62 at 1 with JX 61 at 1 and JX 64 at 1. See also JX 309 at 7 
(Aruba Board deck summarizing analyst reports and noting that fifteen analysts increased 
their target price). 




• 290  
Galvin Tr. 602-03 (testifying that, with respect to Project Greyhound, "there were things 
that would play out over time"); Galvin Dep. 82 (agreeing "that it would take a couple of 
quarters after announcement of the initiation of the transformation to see the real results 
and have the results on Wall Street"). 
• 291  
JX 638 at 3 (transcript from Aruba earnings call). 
• 292  
JX 363 (internal HP email summarizing the earnings announcement). 
• 293  
JX 245. 
• 294  
JX 638 at 13 (Galvin stating Aruba was "just being prudent in a mixed environment" and 
"[n]ot getting ahead of our skis"); see also JX 355 at 1 (email from Galvin to Aruba 
Board: "our guide is shaping up to be more cautious than our strong results"). 
• 295  
See JX 357 at 1 (Neri: "We told our story and we were on point."); JX 360 (email from 
HP's Senior Vice President of Corporate Development: "I thought the results were pretty 
good. . . . They blew past the revenue expectations for the quarter. But they guided soft, 
below consensus."); JX 780 at 2 (internal HP deck discussing Aruba's November earnings 
announcement and commenting that "[t]he softer guidance did not cause us to change our 
financial model") 
• 296  
See JX 357 at 1 (internal email among members of the HP deal team: "They are down 8% 
after hours though because of guidance below consensus for this quarter (although it 
looks like the range of guidance is still within expectations). Good time to pull the trigger 
and snap them up I would say."); Hardegree Dep. 193 (observing that the stock price drop 
"probably did, on balance" put HP "in a more tacti[cally] advantaged position"). 
• 297  
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See 777 A.2d at 243 ("In this appeal, we consider the fiduciary duties owed by a parent 
corporation to the subsidiary's minority stockholders in the context of a 'short-form' 
merger."). 
• 298  
Dell Trial Fair Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *32. 
• 299  
Id. 
• 300  
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *1-2, *34. 
• 301  
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *34. 
• 302  
See 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *34-35 (citing JX 96; JX 110; JX 137; JX 170; JX 
226; JX 344; JX 530). 
• 303  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *19 ("In short, the record does not 
adequately support the Court of Chancery's conclusion that the market for Dell's stock 
was inefficient and that a valuation gap in the Company's market trading price existed in 
advance of the lengthy market check, an error that contributed to the trial court's decision 
to disregard the deal price."). 
• 304  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *16 & n.112 (citing analyst reports discussing Dell's 
M&A activity). 
• 305  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 (citing DFC, 172 A.3d 346). Legal historians can 
debate how longstanding that endorsement had been. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. 
(Technicolor II), 684 A.2d 289, 301 (Del. 1996) (observing, in context of appraisal of 
publicly traded company following arm's-length deal, that "the market price of shares 
may not be representative of fair value" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Rapid-Am. 
Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del. 1992) (describing the Court of Chancery's 
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rejection of market value in Chicago Corp. v. Munds, 20 Del. Ch. 142, 172 A. 452 (Del. 
Ch. 1934), and observing that "Munds' succinct evaluation of the market has lost none of 
its luster"); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. (Technicolor I), 542 A.2d 1182, 
1187 n.8 (Del. 1988) ("Information and insight not communicated to the market may not 
be reflected in stock prices; thus, minority shareholders being cashed out may be 
deprived of part of the true investment value of their shares. The issue we are addressing 
is not the manipulation of the transaction, nor the suppression or misstatement of material 
information by insiders defrauding the market. Instead, we recognize that the majority 
may have insight into their company's future based primarily on bits and pieces of 
nonmaterial information that have value as a totality." (citations omitted)). See generally 
Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 8 ("Delaware appraisal law has never been 
particularly friendly to the idea that stock market prices always accurately represent a 
proportional share of the value of the enterprise as a going concern."). If the lens is 
broadened to take in fiduciary duty cases, the longstanding nature of the endorsement 
becomes even more debatable. See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 
1384 (Del. 1995) (reaffirming the Delaware Supreme Court's recognition of the threat of 
substantive coercion, defined as "the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an 
underpriced offer because they disbelieve management's representations of intrinsic 
value" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Paramount Communications, Inc. 
v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1989) ("Thus, we endorse the Chancellor's 
conclusion that it is not a breach of faith for directors to determine that the present stock 
market price of shares is not representative of true value or that there may indeed be 
several market values for any corporation's stock."); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 
858, 875-76 (Del. 1985) ("[I]n the absence of other sound valuation information, the fact 
of a premium [over market price] alone does not provide an adequate basis upon which to 
assess the fairness of an offering price. . . . Using market price as a basis for concluding 
that the premium adequately reflected the true value of the Company was a clearly faulty, 
indeed fallacious, premise, as the defendants' own evidence demonstrates."), overruled on 
other grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009). See generally Bernard 
Black & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden 
Value, 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521 (2002) (surveying Delaware takeover decisions and 
explaining their reliance on a theory of hidden value inconsistent with the efficient capital 
markets hypothesis). If the management-buyout in Dell had instead been an unsolicited, 
all-cash, all-shares offer at the deal price, I have no doubt that the Dell board of directors 
could have defended against that offer based on management's belief in the considerably 
greater long-term value of the company. See Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 
A.3d 48, 108-13 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
Setting temporal characterizations aside, I do not question the authority of the Delaware 
Supreme Court to endorse a traditional framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis 
as a method of assessing the reliability of market prices in appraisal proceedings. Once 
the Delaware Supreme Court has done so, the obligation of a trial judge is to adhere to 
that endorsement and its implications. 
• 306  
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Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *25. 
• 307  
See 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17 ("The record before us provides no rational, 
factual basis for such a 'valuation gap.'"); id. ("There is also no evidence in the record that 
investors were 'myopic' or shortsighted."). The senior tribunal believed that, without any 
evidence, I "presumed" that "'investor myopia' and hangover from the Company's 'nearly 
$14 billion investment in its transformation, which had not yet begun to generate the 
anticipated results,' produced a 'valuation gap'" and this "presumption contributed to the 
trial court's decision to assign no weight to Dell's stock price or deal price." 2017 Del. 
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *16 (quoting Dell Trial Fair Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 
WL 3186538, at *32, *34). 
I did not use the term "presumption," and I regret that poor drafting on my part seemingly 
created the impression that I had applied a presumption of some sort. I personally thought 
I was relying on record evidence that took the form of contemporaneous assessments by 
knowledgeable insiders about investors' growing short-term focus and a divergence 
between the trading price and indications of fundamental value. See Dell Trial Fair 
Value, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 2016 WL 3186538, at *2 (discussing divergence 
between management's internal valuation and the market price, including Mr. Dell's 
testimony that the market just "didn't get" Dell (Tr. 409) and his belief that, in spite of 
Dell's transformation, "Dell [was] still seen as a PC business" (JX 44 at 1)); id. 
(discussing management's hiring consultants to address market misperception (JX 46 at 
1)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *4 (discussing Mr. Dell's assessment of 
divergence between short-term results and long-term value (JX 109 at 7; JX 110 at 1)); 
id. (discussing management's reports to board regarding short-term challenges and need 
to "sacrifice short term results" to create long-term value (JX 96 at 2; JX 97 at 16)); 2016 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *5 (discussing JP Morgan report explaining that Dell's 
recent earnings misses "have put investors in a 'wait and see mode' with increased focus 
on quarter-by-quarter execution and improved visibility" (JX 137 at 7)); 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 81, [WL] at *7 (discussing views of JPMorgan and Goldman Sachs regarding 
factors contributing to low market valuation that appeared disconnected from 
fundamentals (JX 170)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *9 (discussing Mr. Dell's 
reasons for proposing a going-private transaction including that his initiatives would be 
"poorly received by the public markets" and that they "could best be accomplished in an 
environment without quarterly earnings pressure" (JX 231 at 2)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
81, [WL] at *19 (discussing buyout group presentations to financing sources and ratings 
agencies, including management's explanation that poor short-term performance had 
resulted from "conscious trade-offs to reposition and transform the company" (JX 660 at 
32)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *17 (comparing analyst response to results which 
focused on quarterly earnings miss with Boston Consulting Group's internal analysis 
concluding that Dell's long-term earning power would not be adversely affected (JX 
536)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, [WL] at *19 (comparing International Data 
Corporation's response to quarterly results with buyout group's long-term projections to 
lenders and related assessment of company (JX 669; JX 678)); 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 81, 
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[WL] at *34-35 (summarizing evidence of valuation gap, including JX 96; JX 109; JX 
110; JX 137; JX 170; JX 226; JX 344; JX 530). 
That said, I do not question the Delaware Supreme Court's authority to elevate the 
importance for a fair value determination of a trading price generated by a market with 
attributes associated with semi-strong form efficiency. I also do not question the 
Delaware Supreme Court's authority to hold that a trial court should require evidence 
sufficient to make findings undermining market efficiency before considering and 
regarding as persuasive case-specific evidence of the views of knowledgeable insiders. 
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17 (observing that I did not 
make any findings inconsistent with the premises of market efficiency, such as findings 
that "Dell lacked a vast and diffuse base of public stockholders, that information about 
the Company was sparse or restricted, that there was not an active trading market for 
Dell's shares, or that Dell had a controlling stockholder—or that the market for its stock 
lacked any of the hallmarks of an efficient market"). 
• 308  
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp. (DFC Trial), 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016 WL 
3753123, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016), rev'd sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield 
Value P'rs, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017). 
• 309  
Id. (citing Barner Tr. 533-37 and JX 428 at 16). 
• 310  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372. 
• 311  
Id. at 373. 
• 312  
Id. at 374 n.145. To the extent a buyer bases its assessment on synergistic gains or other 
aspects of value that would not exist but for the transaction, the Delaware Supreme 
Court's "candid" observation regarding tension with the statutory standard makes sense to 
me. To the extent that a buyer is assessing the target's standalone value in its pre-deal 
configuration, it is not clear to me why any tension would exist. I personally would 
regard the beliefs of knowledgeable market participants, including the buyer, as relevant 
evidence of fair value. See In re Appraisal of Dole Food Co., Inc., 114 A.3d 541 (Del. 
Ch. 2014) (ordering production of valuation materials prepared by appraisal petitioners 
when deciding whether to purchase or sell shares of the subject company's stock). The 
market price is, after all, merely an aggregation of the views of knowledgeable market 
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participants. Id. at 559 ("The market price . . . represents an aggregation of the views that 
many lay people hold about the value of a stock."); see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 367 
(discussing "the collective judgment of value embodied in a market price"). Nor would 
one need to exclude the possibility of downside risk when evaluating the buyer's 
valuation, to the extent that the buyer had not already taken that risk into account. A court 
could consider evidence showing that the buyer's assessment was overly optimistic. In the 
past, courts deciding appraisal cases have considered conceptually similar valuation 
indications. Chancellor Allen considered the fact that "knowledgeable officers and 
directors all sold their stock" at the transaction price. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, 1990 WL 161084, at *32 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (Allen, C.), 
aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993). Chancellor 
Chandler considered third-party offers to purchase corporate assets, such as a wholly 
owned subsidiary whose operations were not affected by the merger giving rise to 
appraisal rights. See Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 702 (Del. Ch. 1996) 
(considering offers to purchase one of corporation's two remaining businesses four 
months after the merger, one year after the merger, and two years after the merger). 
That said, I do not question the Delaware Supreme Court's authority to instruct the trial 
courts that when determining fair value, they should give less weight to the views of 
individual market participants, such as the buyer, and more weight to the collective views 
of many market participants, aggregated through trading, or the information generated by 
a sale process. 
• 313  
JX 466 at 1-2 (internal Aruba email distributing report). 
• 314  
Id. at 1 (email from Aruba General Counsel suggesting the stock price "reflects the 
misconception that we missed. We actually beat guidance but no one knows that yet"). 
• 315  
The idea of announcing the merger along with Aruba's strong quarterly results came from 
Aruba management, not HP. When Whitman and Neri first re-engaged with Orr at dinner 
on January 21, 2015, Orr suggested announcing the deal at an industry conference at the 
beginning of March. JX 423 (email from Orr relaying exchange to Aruba management). 
When Johansson contacted Orr at the end of January to notify him HP intended to bid 
imminently, Orr accelerated the timeline, proposing "getting a deal announced by 
[Aruba's] earnings on Feb 26." JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing Johansson's 
relay of the call). When Evercore later attempted to negotiate with HP's banker, Evercore 
again "emphasized that [Aruba would] like to announce [the] deal at or before the 
[Aruba] earnings announcement" because Aruba was "afraid stock runs like Ubiquiti's 
did which could make the deal more challenging from the [Aruba] perspective." JX 491 
(email from Barclays to HP recounting exchange). 
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• 316  
See, e.g., DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016 WL 3753123, at *13 
("[D]iscouraging financial results [were] issued on April 2, 2014, the same day the 
transaction was announced."); In re Dollar Thrifty S'holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 591 (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 8, 2010) (Strine, V.C.) ("Dollar Thrifty's advisors were suspicious that Hertz 
wanted to use the deal to cover up what would be an otherwise disappointing earnings 
announcement, but eventually concluded that Frissora's eagerness was attributable to a 
normal desire to announce the deal in conjunction with an earnings release."); In re Trans 
World Airlines, Inc. S'holders Litig., 1988 Del. Ch. LEXIS 139, 1988 WL 111271, at *4 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1988) ("The proposal now under consideration was announced . . . the 
same day on which the Company announced very favorable financial results for the first 
quarter of 1988."), abrogated on other grounds by Kahn v. Lynch Communication Sys., 
638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994); see also Boutros Dep. 203 ("[I]t's very customary, very, very 
customary, if you're pursuing an M&A transaction and it's close to being done, . . . and 
you have an earnings release, to make the two concurrent, because these are two material 
events that will impact the stock price, and the last thing you want to do is release 
material information piecemeal to your shareholders."); cf. In re Smurfit-Stone Container 
Corp. S'holder Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 79, 2011 WL 2028076, at *8 (Del. Ch. May 
20, 2011) ("[The bidder] threatened to suspend the merger discussions if the proposed 
transaction could not be finalized before the end of the weekend and the release of both 
companies' earnings announcements the following week."). 
• 317  
HP agreed to this course of action, which favored HP's interests. HP also may have 
leaked news of the deal to further mask the significance of Aruba's strong earnings. On 
February 25, 2015, one day before Aruba was scheduled to announce its earnings, 
Bloomberg News ran a story on the merger. JX 866 (article). Qatalyst speculated 
internally that HP had leaked the news so that Aruba's "results and subsequent stock price 
reaction won't be easy to measure." JX 510. Aruba's stock price jumped from $18.37 to 
$22.24. Proxy at 53. 
• 318  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *18 
• 319  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17. 
• 320  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
• 321  
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But cf. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Good Finance, Bad Economics: An 
Analysis of the Fraud-on-the-Market Theory, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1059, 1084-85 (1990) 
(explaining that efficient markets may process different types of information at different 
rates and with different effects). Perhaps in an appropriate case an expert could opine that 
the order in which information was released or the fact that information was bundled 
together had some meaningful effect. No one made that argument or offered that opinion 
here. Absent a case-specific expert opinion supported by credible evidence and the 
weight of social-science research, I do not believe a trial judge has the flexibility to 
disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's framing of the implications of the efficient 
capital markets hypothesis. 
• 322  
JX 659. 
• 323  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *22. 
• 324  
Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT LP, 11 A.3d 214, 217-18 (Del. 2010) (quoting 8 Del. 
C. § 262(h)). 
• 325  
Id. at 218. 
• 326  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 366. 
• 327  
Id. 
• 328  
Id. 
• 329  
Id. at 349 (formatting added). 




• 331  
Id. at 388. 
• 332  
Id. at 388-89. 
• 333  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *16. 
• 334  
Id.; accord 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *22 ("Overall, the weight of evidence shows 
that Dell's deal price has heavy, if not overriding, probative value."). 
• 335  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *17. 
• 336  
2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *26. 
• 337  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370-71. 
• 338  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. The reference to "dissenters" in 
this sentence strikes me as odd because the dissenters have opted not to receive the 
merger consideration. By seeking appraisal, they avoided the possibility of being 
"exploited" by the deal. The larger point seems to be for the trial judge to assess whether 
the deal price is somehow exploitive such that it would exploit the dissenters for the court 
to use it as the basis for awarding fair value. 
• 339  
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal"). 
• 340  
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JX 234 (minutes); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 261 (testifying the Aruba Board came to the 
figure because "[w]e wanted to reaffirm that we thought there was great value there, 
meaning they should bid higher, but we felt like if we put a 3 in the first digit and started 
at 30, that they might conclude that's too big a gap to close and stop discussion"). 
• 341  
JX 491 (email from Barclays to HP relaying Evercore's counter); accord JX 488 at 4 
(internal Evercore emails confirming change in shares outstanding and suggesting 
repurchases caused the change). 
• 342  
JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer 
Price"). 
• 343  
Proxy at 52. 
• 344  
Id. 
• 345  
See Marcus Tr. 151; Warmenhoven Tr. 264 (describing HP and Aruba as a "perfect 
match" because "HP had all the switches and routers" but "no WiFi to speak of"); id. at 
276-77 (calling the synergies "[v]ery substantial" and noting the acquisition "was part of 
not just acquiring share in networking, but a bigger, broader enterprise strategy"); Orr Tr. 
434-35 (discussing the benefits the transaction offered to both Aruba and HP); Galvin Tr. 
578 ("[T]he win-win is HP provided us the muscle that we never had to really stand up to 
Cisco in the high end of the corporate stack, in the big deals. And particularly when you 
start to talk about a wired-wireless convergence, they provided a tremendous amount of 
muscle for us to do that."); DePuy Tr. 682 ("[W]hen you put those two together, they 
could attack customers in a way they could neither do individually."); Dages Tr. 753-54, 
783; see also JX 805 at 2 (late-stage internal HP approval deck noting the acquisition 
"will provide complementary go to market and wireless capabilities and uniquely 
position[] HP as the market moves towards a unified wired/wireless solution"); id. at 7-8 
(estimating approximately $1.4 billion in synergies); id. at 26 (slide titled "[Aruba] Fills 
Key Product Gaps Across HPN's WLAN Product Portfolio"). 
• 346  
JX 805; see also JX 350 (similar deck for earlier approval); JX 356 (same); JX 383 
(McKinsey synergy analysis). The petitioners argued that the court cannot rely on HP's 
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analyses because they are hearsay. The petitioners raised their objections in the Pre-Trial 
Order and again at trial. See PTO ¶¶ 585-86 & Ex. A (objecting to JX 350 and JX 805); 
Warmenhoven Tr. 273-74 (objecting to JX 350 as "hearsay posed" to Warmenhoven 
because "[h]e's never seen the document"). 
HN10  Hearsay "is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at 
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." D.R.E. 
801(c). "Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by law or by [the Delaware 
Uniform Rules of Evidence]." D.R.E. 802. Rule of Evidence 803(6) recognizes an 
exception for documents 
made at or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if 
it was the regular practice of that business activity to make the 
[document], [*73]  all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or other 
qualified witness . . . unless the source of information or the method or 
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. 
D.R.E. 803(6). "The business records exception to the hearsay rule permits the admission 
of hearsay documents that are likely to be trustworthy because a business regularly 
maintains and relies on them." Brown v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 774 A.2d 232, 239 (Del. 
2001). "The principal precondition to admission of documents as a business record . . . is 
that the records have sufficient indicia of trustworthiness to be considered reliable." Id. 
(quoting Saks Int'l, Inc. v. M/V Exp. Champion, 817 F.2d 1011, 1013 (2d Cir. 1987)). 
Johansson testified extensively by deposition about HP's thorough, routine approval 
process for reviewing and approving transactions of this nature. See PTO ¶ 575 
(stipulating 
Johansson would testify "by deposition"). He testified that the process regularly includes 
an "Approval to Negotiate," such as the one contained in JX 350, and an "Approval to 
Sign," such as the one contained in JX 805. See Johansson Dep. 22-25. Although 
Johansson's testimony did not explicitly address those two exhibits, his testimony 
satisfies me that HP prepared and maintained them in the ordinary course of its business. 
They therefore have the indicia of trustworthiness contemplated by Rule of Evidence 
803(6). The petitioners' selective introduction of similar, and in some cases nearly 
identical, documents bolsters this conclusion. See, e.g., JX 356 (draft Approval to 
Negotiate deck); JX 398 at 6 (internal HP "discussion materials" deck); JX 780 (later-
dated internal HP "discussion materials" deck). 
• 347  
See JX 907 § 5.2(b)(ii). 
• 348  
Id. at § 5.2(b)(ii)(A), (B). 
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• 349  
Id. at § 5.2(b)(ii)(B)(3). 
• 350  
Id. at § 7.2(b)(iv). 
• 351  
See, e.g., Dent v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2014 Del. Ch. LEXIS 110, 2014 WL 2931180, at 
*8-10 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014) (rejecting fiduciary challenge to "(1) a no-solicitation 
provision; (2) a standstill provision; (3) a change in recommendation provision; (4) 
information rights for [the acquirer]; and (5) a $5 million termination fee" where the 
termination fee represented 4.5% of equity value and the change of recommendation 
provision included an unlimited match right); In re Novell, Inc. S'holder Litig., 2013 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 1, 2013 WL 322560, at *10 (Del. Ch. Jan. 3, 2013) (describing "the no 
solicitation provision, the matching rights provision, and the termination fee" as 
"customary and well within the range permitted under Delaware law" and observing that 
"[t]he mere inclusion of such routine terms does not amount to a breach of fiduciary 
duty"); In re Answers Corp. S'holders Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, 2011 WL 
1366780, at *4 & n.47 (Del. Ch. Apr. 11, 2011) (describing "a termination fee plus 
expense reimbursement of 4.4% of the Proposed Transaction's equity value, a no 
solicitation clause, a 'no-talk' provision limiting the Board's ability to discuss an 
alternative transaction with an unsolicited bidder, a matching rights provision, and a 
force-the-vote requirement" as "standard merger terms" that "do not alone constitute 
breaches of fiduciary duty" (citation omitted)); In re Atheros Commc'ns, Inc. S'holder 
Litig., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 36, 2011 WL 864928, at *7 n.61 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011) 
(characterizing a no-solicitation provision, a matching right, and a termination fee as 
"standard merger terms" that "do not alone constitute breaches of fiduciary duty" (citation 
omitted)); In re 3Com S'holders Litig., 2009 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, 2009 WL 5173804, at 
*7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009) (describing "the no solicitation provision, the matching rights 
provision, and the termination fee" as "standard merger terms" that "do not alone 
constitute breaches of fiduciary duty"). 
• 352  
See DFC, 172 A.3d at 371 ("[I]t is widely assumed that the sale price in many M&A 
deals includes a portion of the buyer's expected synergy gains, which is part of the 
premium the winning buyer must pay to prevail and obtain control."); Merion Capital 
L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 7324170, at 
*11, *26 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016) (noting that evidence supported the view that the 
merger consideration "included a portion of the value that [the acquirers] expected to 
generate from synergies" and that "[t]he existence of combinatorial synergies provides an 
additional reason to think that" the merger consideration "exceeded the fair value of the 
Company"); see also Olson v. EV3, Inc., 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, 2011 WL 704409, at 
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*10 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21, 2011) ("In an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price 
generally will exceed fair value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that 
includes . . . a share of the anticipated synergies . . . ."); Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P'ship v. 
Union Fin. Gp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 356 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, V.C.) ("[A]cquirers 
typically share a portion of synergies with sellers in sales transactions and that portion is 
value that would be left wholly in the hands of the selling company's stockholders, as a 
price that the buyer was willing to pay to capture the selling company and the rest of the 
synergies."). 
• 353  
See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *20-22 (describing company's 
efforts to generate competition for the buy-out group); DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (relying on 
the Court of Chancery's finding that "the transaction resulted from a robust market search 
that lasted approximately two years in which financial and strategic buyers had an open 
opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal protections"). Before Dell and DFC, a series 
of Court of Chancery decisions had stressed the importance of competition during the 
sale process. See In re PetSmart, Inc., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, 2017 WL 2303599, at 
*40 n.439 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2017) (giving exclusive weight to merger price where 
"negotiated at arm's-length, in real time, after a well-run pre-signing auction that takes 
place in the midst of a fully functioning market"); Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, 
Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at *14-15 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015) 
(giving exclusive weight to merger price where the company conducted "a robust, arm's-
length sales process" that involved "two auctions over a period of several months," and 
"was able to and did engage multiple potential buyers during these periods," and where 
the lone remaining bidder "raised its bid multiple times because it believed the auction 
was still competitive"); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int'l Corp., 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 4540443, at *9 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015) (relying on "thorough" 
sale process initiated in response to "a well-publicized hostile bid and a target actively 
seeking a white knight"); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 
2015 WL 399726, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015) (giving exclusive weight to the deal 
price where the transaction resulted from an "auction process, which process itself 
involved a market canvas and uncovered a motivated buyer"); Merlin P'rs LP v. 
AutoInfo, Inc., 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 
2015) (giving exclusive weight to merger price that "was negotiated at arm's length, 
without compulsion, and with adequate information" and it was "the result of competition 
among many potential acquirers"); Huff Fund Inv. P'ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 262, 2013 WL 5878807, at *14 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1, 2013) (evaluating sale process 
and concluding that "the bidders were in fact engaged in a process resembling the English 
ascending-bid auction" involving direct competition between bidders); Union Ill., 847 
A.2d at 359 (using merger price as "best indicator of value" where the merger "resulted 
from a competitive and fair auction" in which "several buyers with a profit motive" were 
able to evaluate the company and "make bids with actual money behind them"). 
• 354  
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See Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *20 ("Nothing in the record 
suggests that increased competition would have produced a better result."); 2017 Del. 
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *21 ("The Court of Chancery stressed its view that the lack of 
competition from a strategic buyer lowered the relevance of the deal price. But its 
assessment that more bidders—both strategic and financial—should have been involved 
assumes there was some party interested in proceeding. Nothing in the record indicates 
that was the case."); see also 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, [WL] at *23 ("[A]side from the 
theoretical, the Court of Chancery did not point to any bidder who actually shied away 
from exploring an acquisition out of fear of the winner's curse phenomenon."); 2017 Del. 
LEXIS 518, [WL] at *25 ("[T]he court did not identify any possible bidders that were 
actually deterred because of Mr. Dell's status."). 
• 355  
Id. 
• 356  
Id.; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 ("[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a 
company is itself relevant to its value."). 
• 357  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370. 
• 358  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. 
• 359  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. 
• 360  
See JX 348 (email from Neri to Whitman). 
• 361  
Johansson Dep. 112. 
• 362  
Id. 
• 363  
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See Proxy at 48-49; see also JX 328 ("We have been in dialogue with [HP] since August 
27, and have not received a proposal in all this time. . . . We cannot continue to wait for 
them."); JX 367 (email from Aruba to Qatalyst advising it had "decided to terminate 
discussions with [HP] at this time" and that it would "let [Qatalyst] know if discussions 
resume"); JX 372 at 1-2 (email from Aruba General Counsel relaying conversation with 
Johansson during which she explained that "[w]e feel it's time to suspend discussions" 
because "it has reached a point where we need to focus on running our business and not 
be distracted by discussions that did not seem to be progressing"). 
• 364  
See Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 7324170, at *19 ("The 
Board's track record of saying 'no' gave [the acquirers] a credible reason to believe that 
the Board would not sell below its internal reserve price."). 
• 365  
PTO ¶ 155. 
• 366  
JX 423 (email from Orr relaying exchange to Aruba management). 
• 367  
JX 454 (internal Barclays email summarizing executive's relay of the call). 
• 368  
JX 398 at 1-2 (cover email for deck seeking board approval); JX 805 at 12 (internal HP 
deck). 
• 369  
JX 452 at 3 ("Indicative Non-Binding Proposal"). 
• 370  
Proxy at 51. 
• 371  
JX 798 at 2 (Barclays slide entitled "Impact of New Share Count and B/S Data on Offer 
Price"). 




• 373  
JX 497 (internal HP email from Johansson); accord JX 805 at 12 (timeline showing 
"02/08 — HP offer $24.00 and present as best and final. [Aruba] provide new shares 
outstanding and cash information supporting paying $24.67 at the same enterprise 
value."). 
• 374  
JX 235 at 1-2 (minutes); Proxy at 52. 
• 375  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *21. 
• 376  
Id.; see also DFC, 172 A.3d at 375 n.154 ("[T]he absence of synergistic buyers for a 
company is itself relevant to its value."). 
• 377  
See Warmenhoven Tr. 260 ("[I]t was definitive noninterest."); id. 329-30 (agreeing 
potential bidders provided "feedback" that they "had no strategic interest in acquiring 
Aruba" and that it "[h]ad nothing to do with the price"). 
• 378  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370. 
• 379  
Id. at 371. 
• 380  
See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 349 (relying on the Court of Chancery's findings that "the 
company was purchased by a third party in an arm's length sale" and that "there was no 
hint of self-interest" in the transaction); PetSmart, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 89, 2017 WL 
2303599, at *40 n.439 (acknowledging the persuasiveness of a merger price that was 
"negotiated at arm's-length"); BMC, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 268, 2015 WL 6164771, at 
*14 (giving exclusive weight to merger price where "[t]he record here demonstrates that 
the Company conducted a robust, arm's-length sales process"); AutoInfo, 2015 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 128, 2015 WL 2069417, at *12 (relying on the merger price where "[t]he Merger 
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was negotiated at arm's length, without compulsion, and with adequate information"); 
CKx, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, 2013 WL 5878807, at *13 (giving exclusive weight to 
merger price where "the process by which CKx was marketed to potential buyers was 
thorough, effective, and free from any specter of self-interest or disloyalty"); Highfields 
Capital, Ltd. v. AXA Fin., Inc., 939 A.2d 34, 42 (Del. Ch. 2007) (stating that a reviewing 
court should give "substantial evidentiary weight" to the deal price when "the transaction 
giving rise to the appraisal resulted from an arm's-length process between two 
independent parties"). 
• 381  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. 
• 382  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. 
• 383  
JX 412 at 1 ("Meg [Whitman] spoke with conviction and emotion over dinner that they 
[Qatalyst] were guilty." (referring to alleged fraud involving sale of Autonomy to HP)); 
JX 420 (Warmenhoven reporting that Whitman said "Qatalyst, Frank [Quattrone] & 
George [Boutros] are not welcome in the negotiations. The issue is bigger than 
Autonomy and goes back to EBay & Yahoo."); JX 426 (email from Orr to Aruba 
management updating them on Qatalyst situation and reporting that, when Boutros 
learned of HP's position, he was "so emotional, defensive AND offensive (to Meg 
[Whitman]) that he hardly let me talk"); accord Warmenhoven Tr. 252-53 (testifying that 
Whitman told him, "I don't care who you get, but it can't be Qatalyst" and that "I'm not 
going to take into my boardroom a deal proposed by Qatalyst"). Aruba has argued that, 
although Whitman refused to work with Qatalyst, she did not pick Aruba's banker. To my 
mind, these are questions of degree, with vetoing a banker to reduce the other side's 
choice set operating as a less extreme version of picking the other side's banker. In this 
case, however, vetoing effectively meant picking. Warmenhoven testified that, when 
considering bankers, Francis and Qatalyst were the only names who came up and that 
"there was no third name mentioned." Warmenhoven Tr. 238. 
• 384  
JX 437 at 1 (Warmenhoven explaining that, in Qatalyst's view, "[t]he issue is not Aruba. 
It is about the [Qatalyst] brand . . . . If word spreads that they were tossed from this deal 
because HP will not engage with them on any M&A transaction, that creates a big issue 
for them. . . . Frank wants to save his firm . . . . The relationship, or lack thereof, between 
[Qatalyst] and HP / Meg [Whitman] is now their focus."); see also JX 521 (Quattrone 
expressing concern that "Evercore will for sure be beating its chest about its role in this 




• 385  
See JX 430 (Quattrone asking Warmenhoven to intervene with Whitman on his behalf); 
JX 434 at 1 (Quattrone asking Whitman for "the opportunity to speak or meet with you at 
your earliest convenience to understand from you directly what your concerns are and 
give me the opportunity to address them" and promising that "while our loyalties are 
always to our client on any assignment, I am confident we can address your concerns, 
play a constructive role and engage with your team in a professional manner"); JX 440 at 
1 (email from Orr to Aruba management asking "how much time we allow" before saying 
"sorry, [Qatalyst]. We need to protect our transaction. [W]e cannot worry about your 
brand!"). At Quattrone's behest, Warmenhoven sent at least three emails to Whitman in a 
forty-eight-hour period in which he vouched for Qatalyst and asked Whitman to meet 
with Quattrone. See JX 430 (asking Whitman to meet personally with Quattrone); JX 436 
(vouching for Quattrone and expressing confidence that "if you two could 'clear the air' 
[then] Frank and [Qatalyst] could be constructive participants in getting this deal done"); 
id. (following-up with Whitman and asking whether her objection was to Qatalyst or only 
to Boutros). 
• 386  
JX 426 at 2 (internal Aruba email); see also JX 5 (executed engagement letter with 
Evercore showing fee of 1/4%); JX 413 (Warmenhoven observing that "Evercore is new 
in the tech sector, so they may be willing to do a deal at 1/4% just to get a deal done that 
they can brag about publicly"); Warmenhoven Tr. 241 (explaining that, when HP first 
approached Aruba in August 2014, he considered contacting Francis, but passed because 
he had no prior experience with Evercore and "didn't know the team"). 
• 387  
See, e.g., JX 427 ("Truly amazing! This is a franchise transaction! Well done!"); id. 
("This is franchise defining. Well done, and it shows the power of loyalty, which you 
have always eschewed! [sic]"); JX 428 ("Just remarkable, Stu [Francis.] What a coup! 
Would be, as you say, a dynamic advance for Evercore in The Valley."); JX 439 
(congratulatory emails from two additional senior bankers). 
• 388  
JX 505 (Evercore bankers noting that that "[Whitman] is going to be very active" and that 
HP "[w]ould be a great new relationship."). 
• 389  
Id. 




• 391  
Warmenhoven Tr. 255. 
• 392  
Orr Tr. 452. 
• 393  
See Warmenhoven Tr. 228-31; id. at 273 (Orr's "going to be 66 in March. He's told me 
many times that he did not want to be in a regular employment situation when he turned 
65"); id. at 289 ("[H]e was going to leave before his 65th birthday."); Orr Tr. 371-73 
(describing activities during retirement, including spending time with his children, 
learning to cook, traveling to Japan and taking Japanese classes, working with The 
Philanthropy Workshop, and pursuing other philanthropic endeavors including founding 
a non-profit business that provides low-power, solar-panel-driven phones); id. at 377 ("So 
every year I say, you know, it's time. There's a lot of things I need to do. I need to go 
back to my philanthropic work. My kids in Africa keep yelling at me to go back and visit. 
. . . So I was just getting really anxious to do my own things."); id. at 378 ("I honestly am 
having fun building this kind of transforming company against the incumbent, and 
enjoying kind of stirring up a new way of doing things. But it's getting to the point that I 
have to tell myself there are other things I want to do in life."). 
Ironically, it was Aruba that stressed Orr's desire to retire in its pre-trial brief and at trial 
as a means of undermining the reliability of management's projections, which Aruba 
argued were too aggressive because they assumed that Orr would stay with the Company. 
See Dkt. 138 at 20-21. Aruba also sought to use Orr's desire to retire to blunt the 
petitioners' argument that HP's unauthorized discussions with Orr about post-transaction 
employment undermined the negotiations. As Aruba pitched it, Orr agreed to remain 
reluctantly. See id. at 44 ("Orr will testify that he planned to retire, but he was motivated 
by loyalty to his team and a request from HP to stay on."). Once Aruba introduced the 
retirement theory, the petitioners embraced it as an additional factor that undermined the 
course of the negotiations, while disputing that Aruba's ability to achieve its projections 
depended on Orr. 
Aruba also helped prove the petitioners' case on this point by focusing at trial on an email 
exchange from March 7, 2015, between Orr and an Aruba director that discussed why the 
merger benefitted Aruba's customers and employees, including its salesforce in the field. 
See JX 535; see also Warmenhoven Tr. 177-83 (discussing JX 535); Orr Tr. 381-97 
(same). Aruba argued that this email showed that the HP deal was a good one. Whether 
the deal was good for these corporate constituencies is a different question than whether 
it provided fair value for stockholders. What the email did show is that Orr pursued the 
HP deal (at least in part) because of loyalties to constituencies beyond the stockholders. 
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In the grander scheme of life, I find that commendable. For the narrow purpose of 
Delaware corporate law, those competing loyalties are factors that a court has to weigh. 
• 394  
See Warmenhoven Tr. 286 ("Dominic [Orr] guaranteed to us that he would go through an 
orderly transition, that if we found the right person, he would step aside, and we would 
just hire the person as CEO. And if we couldn't find somebody of that experience, he 
would stay on for a year and help groom him."); id. at 290 ("Dom [Orr] was a very 
committed CEO, and independent of the financial implications, he would not have left 
abruptly. He was a founder of this company. And a founder is . . . it's like having a child. 
You don't abandon it."); Orr Tr. 458 (testifying that he would not have left without a 
suitable replacement); JX 326 at 1 (Orr explaining that he wanted to sell at a premium, 
take care of the employees, and ensure that "the organization and structure is [sic] set up 
for success and maintaining fun and pride and minimiz[ing] large company pain"). 
• 395  
Aruba has argued that Orr could not have been motivated by a desire to retire because he 
agreed to run the legacy business for HP for a period of time after the acquisition. I think 
Orr was planning several moves ahead, and he realized that committing to stay on for a 
period of time after the acquisition would help get the deal done. That, in turn, would 
bring him closer to returning to a retirement during which he had engaged in a variety of 
rewarding and commendable pursuits. 
• 396  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *24. 
• 397  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370. 
• 398  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 372; see also Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchs. Bancorp of W. Penn., 
Inc., 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 167, 2016 WL 6651411, at *8 n.95 (Del. Ch. Nov. 10, 2016) 
(surveying academic literature); EV3, 2011 Del. Ch. LEXIS 34, 2011 WL 704409, at *10 
("In an arm's-length, synergistic transaction, the deal price generally will exceed fair 
value because target fiduciaries bargain for a premium that includes . . . a share of the 
anticipated synergies . . . ."). 
• 399  
Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 507. 
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• 400  
Dages Opening Report ¶ 68. 
• 401  
See, e.g., Montgomery Cellular Hldg. Co., Inc. v. Dobler, 880 A.2d 206, 221 (Del. 2005) 
("The Court of Chancery was unable precisely to quantify those 'deal-making' synergies, 
because [the respondent] did not present any reliable evidence at trial of what those 
synergies were worth."); ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 
2017 WL 3421142, at *31 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2017) (recounting respondent synergy 
estimates, noting that "[o]ther synergy estimates were higher still," and concluding that, 
"[i]f the court relied on Clearwire's deal price, it would have to determine the value of 
those synergies and back them out"); Ramtron, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 177, 2015 WL 
4540443, at *26 (acknowledging that the "[p]etitioner's approach may understate the net 
synergies" but nonetheless adopting it because "it better conforms to the evidence 
adduced at trial than [the respondent's] position"). 
• 402  
Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 353 n.27, 364. 
• 403  
Id. at 353 n.26. 
• 404  
Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61. 
• 405  
Id. at 60-62. 
• 406  
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 64-67. 
• 407  
See Highfields, 939 A.2d at 61 & n.87 (crediting synergy estimations included in a study 
that "was not of the typically skewed, buy-side variety: rather, it was an objective study 
created by a team of actuaries whose professional standards require neutrality" and noting 
the study "stands in contrast to the often biased valuation work presented to opposing 
boards by investment bankers representing a particular company"). 
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• 408  
Dages Opening Report ¶ 68. 
• 409  
Id. ¶ 67. 
• 410  
Dages Opening Report ¶ 129; accord Dages Tr. 782 ("Q. You are all in on a DCF. Right? 
A. I think that's fair."); id. ("I looked at other values, but the opinion was always stated, 
and has always been stated, at the beginning as being based on DCF."). 
• 411  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 9 ("I determined the fair value of Aruba's stock as of May 18, 
2015 (the 'valuation date') by performing a discounted cash flow ('DCF') valuation."). 
• 412  
See generally Jesse A. Finkelstein & John D. Hendershot, Appraisal Rights in Mergers & 
Consolidations, 38-5th C.P.S. §§ IV(H)(3), V.E. (BNA) [hereinafter Appraisal Rights]. 
• 413  
Pinson v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 50, 1989 WL 17438, at *8 n.11 
(Del. Ch. Feb. 28, 1989). 
• 414  
Andaloro v. PFPC Worldwide, Inc., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Aug. 19, 2005) (Strine, V.C.). 
• 415  
In re Radiology Assoc., Inc., 611 A.2d 485, 490 (Del. Ch. 1991) (quoting Technicolor, 
1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 259, 1990 WL 161084, at *7). 
• 416  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *28 
• 417  
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Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, 2004 WL 1152338, at *5 
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2004); see also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 2003 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
146, 2003 WL 23700218, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec. 31, 2003) ("When management 
projections are made in the ordinary course of business, they are generally deemed 
reliable. Experts who then vary from management forecasts should proffer legitimate 
reasons for such variance.") (footnote omitted)), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 884 A.2d 26 
(Del. 2005); Gray v. Cytokine Pharmasciences, Inc., 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 48, 2002 WL 
853549, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 25, 2002) (finding "litigation-driven projections to be 
unreliable" because "[a]ny other result would condone allowing a company's 
management or board of directors to disavow their own data in order to justify a lower 
valuation in an appraisal proceeding"). 
• 418  
JX 233 at 1 (minutes from meeting where projections presented showing finance team 
accompanied presentation with "third party analyst data regarding the enterprise wireless 
LAN market growth rates for the last three years," "compared the Company's revenue 
growth rates to the market growth rate," and "presented financial scenarios and explained 
the assumptions underlying each scenario" during which "Board members asked 
questions, provided feedback and discussion ensued"); see also Warmenhoven Tr. 223-24 
(discussing process by which Aruba Board reviewed and "chose to accept" the February 
Projections). 
• 419  
See Warmenhoven Tr. 219-20; id. at 313-14 (confirming Galvin prepared the June Plan 
"in the spring of 2014, as part of the normal operations" of the Company); Galvin Tr. 
553-54 (discussing development of "top-down" projections incorporating "broader 
strategic assumptions" discussed by the Aruba Board regularly at the "June meeting"). 
• 420  
See JX 297 at 2 (email from Galvin to member of the finance team); JX 315 at 1 (email 
from Galvin to Qatalyst banker conveying early draft of the October Projections); see 
also Warmenhoven Tr. 314-15 (discussing Aruba's ordinary process of preparing a yearly 
operating plan in September); Galvin Tr. 586 (acknowledging the September figures 
adjusted margins, reflecting "[t]he overall impacts" of Project Greyhound). 
• 421  
See Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 209-217 (explaining reliance on February Projections); 
see also Warmenhoven Tr. 220-22 (discussing how and why the finance team made the 
projections more conservative); Galvin Tr. 558-563 (discussing process of extending 




• 422  
See Marcus Opening Report ¶ 217; Warmenhoven Tr. 358 (referring to the added two 
years as "a linear extrapolation"); Galvin Tr. 558-59 (testifying the February Projections 
initially went out three years "[a]nd then ultimately until 2020, yes"); Dages Tr. 734 
(discussing "the extensions that were done with Qatalyst to take it out to 2020"). 
• 423  
See Marcus Opening Report ¶ 221; Galvin Tr. 560 (confirming February Projections used 
by bankers). 
• 424  
Proxy at 63-64; Orr Tr. 529 (confirming approved projections to be included in the proxy 
and shared with Qatalyst). 
• 425  
See Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 218-220. 
• 426  
The Company had projected a tax rate of 4% for 2015 and 2016 and 25% thereafter. See 
JX 475 at 1 (email from Galvin to Qatalyst suggesting "I would do 4% thr[ough] 17; then 
do 25% thereafter"). Management attributed the rate to the Company's stockpile of 
valuable net-operating loss credits or "NOLs" from its early, pre-profit days. Due to those 
credits, the Company had a cash tax rate of only 3.2% and 3.1% in 2013 and 2014, 
respectively. The Company anticipated it had enough credits remaining to continue 
paying low taxes through at least 2016. JX 506 at 1 (internal email summarizing available 
net-operating loss credits and approximate use rates as of February 2015); see also JX 
895 at 93 (2014 10-K: "As of July 1, 2014, the Company's federal loss carryforwards for 
income tax purposes were approximately $131 million with expiration dates starting in 
2028."). Based on this evidence, Marcus adopted the Company's estimates. See Marcus 
Opening Report Ex. 7-1. 
Aruba instructed Qatalyst to use the same tax figures that Marcus ultimately adopted. See 
JX 654 (Qatalyst working spreadsheet indicating Galvin provided tax rates); Marcus Tr. 
46-47; Galvin Tr. 622. 
• 427  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 222. 
• 428  
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See, e.g., DFC, 172 A.3d at 380 ("Indeed, if the record unambiguously supported the 
proposition that DFC was to continue a new spurt of growth past 2018, it would have 
been more appropriate to project out to a point where steady-state growth began. By 
doing that, the appraiser would have to assess with discipline the next period after the 
projections end and also the potential that the period might be negative, as well as that 
another period of above-market growth might be followed by a terminal growth rate more 
like inflation than the risk-free rate." (footnote omitted)); Prescott Group Small Cap, L.P. 
v. Coleman Co., Inc., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, 2004 WL 2059515, at *29 (Del. Ch. 
Sept. 8, 2004) (Jacobs, J.) ("At the time of the merger, Coleman was projecting a 16% 
growth in sales for year 2002, which represented a return to Coleman's prior operating 
levels. Dr. Kursh utilized a three stage model because he did not believe a 16% growth 
rate was sustainable long-term." (footnote omitted)); Robert W. Holthausen & Mark E. 
Zmijewski, Corporate Valuation Theory, Evidence & Practice 216 (2014) ("We would 
prepare detailed year-by-year forecasts for the company until the company reaches steady 
state. You may need to value a company's cash flows for five years, ten years, or longer if 
the company is far from becoming a stable mature company as of the valuation date."); 
Shannon P. Pratt & Alina V. Niculita, Valuing a Business 219 (5th ed. 2008) ("The 
appropriate length of the forecast period should be until that variability stops; at the point 
in time that the company expects normalized or level growth, the terminal value is 
calculated."). 
• 429  
See Johansson Dep. 40 (testifying that, in valuing a company, HP "want[s] to create a 
model that gets you to like a steady state . . . . [T]ypically, the companies we look at, ten 
years is kind of appropriate . . . . So we tend to do a ten-year DCF just to get to that 
steady state."). 
• 430  
In calculating his WACC, Marcus used an all-equity capital structure. He noted, however, 
that evidence in the record suggested that Aruba would have issued $300 million in 
convertible debt if HP had not made its approach. See, e.g., PTO ¶ 51, JX 224 (Aruba 
Board subcommittee minutes); JX 325 (email from Galvin relaying conversation with 
Barclays banker wherein banker suggested executing the convertible offering). The debt 
would have reduced Aruba's WACC and been a positive signal to the equity markets. 
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 223. The decision to maintain Aruba's all-equity capital 
structure could be seen as a valuation consequence that resulted from the expectation of 
the merger, although one that had a negative effect on Aruba's stockholders by depriving 
them of the value generated by a lower-cost capital structure. Cf. 8 Del. C. § 262(h) 
(instructing Court of Chancery to exclude "any element of value arising from the 
accomplishment or expectation of the merger"). The petitioners have not made this 
argument, so this decision does not consider it. 
• 431  
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In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 2004 WL 
1305745, at *16 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004) (Jacobs, J.). 
• 432  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 225. 
• 433  
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 117, 124. 
• 434  
Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 226-231. 
• 435  
See Merion Capital, L.P. v. 3M Cogent, Inc., 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 
3793896, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2013) ("[O]ne can 'smooth' beta by adjusting historical 
beta by a market beta of 1, using a 1/3 weighting factor for the market and a 2/3 
weighting for the subject company's beta . . . ."); Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 524 
("I find that a beta that gives 2/3 weight to the Bloomberg historic raw beta of 1.32 and 
1/3 weight to the 1.24 industry beta is the best approach to this DCF analysis."). 
• 436  
Holthausen & Zmijewski, supra, at 300 ("Using more recent data might better reflect a 
company's current (and more forward-looking) systematic risk."); Tim Koller, Marc 
Goedhart & David Wessels, Valuation: Measuring and Managing the Value of 
Companies 247 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that "changes in corporate strategy or capital 
structure often lead to changes in risk for stockholders" and that, where that occurs, "a 
long estimation period would place too much weight on irrelevant data"); Shannon P. 
Pratt & Roger J. Grabowski, Cost of Capital: Applications and Examples 208 (5th ed. 
2014) (noting that five-years is more common but where "business characteristics change 
during the sampling period . . . it may be more appropriate to use a shorter sampling 
period. However, as the sampling period used is reduced, the accuracy of the estimate is 
generally reduced."); id. at 224 (recommending that "[i]f the underlying fundamentals of 
the business have changed, a more recent period should be used in developing a beta 
estimate"). Aruba had grown significantly during the years preceding the merger. See 
PTO ¶ 77. Aruba's expert agreed that he typically uses a two-year weakly raw beta when 
calculating WACC. Dages Tr. 793; Dages Dep. 432. 
• 437  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 230. "In addition to the equity risk premium, an equity size 
premium generally is added to the company's cost of equity in the valuation of smaller 
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companies to account for the higher rate of return demanded by investors to compensate 
for the greater risk associated with small company equity." Gearreald v. Just Care, Inc., 
2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 2012 WL 1569818, at *10 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2012). Dages 
disputed the applicability of a size premium at all because, "in [his] experience, a size 
premium is rarely applied to midor larger-cap companies" and "Aruba did not share the 
characteristics that researchers have hypothesized for returns in excess of what is 
predicted by the CAPM." Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 32. He further argued that Aruba 
properly belonged in the sixth rather than fifth decile. Id. 
• 438  
Dages used a WACC of 11%. Dages observed that all three deal advisors and two 
research analysts used higher WACCs. Dages Opening Report Ex. 18; Dages Rebuttal 
Report ¶ 31. 
• 439  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 235. 
• 440  
3M, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 3793896, at *21. 
• 441  
Marcus Opening Report ¶¶ 232-235. Marcus did not clarify why he adopted the risk-free 
rate rather than the projected rate of inflation as the floor for his terminal growth rate. As 
discussed in addressing Dages's report below, some of this court's precedent suggests 
adopting the risk-free rate as a ceiling for a company's long-term sustainable growth rate. 
This court's precedents support adopting the rate of inflation as a floor for a company's 
long-term growth rate. See Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 511-12 ("A viable 
company should grow at least at the rate of inflation and . . . the rate of inflation is the 
floor for a terminal value estimate for a solidly profitable company that does not have an 
identifiable risk of insolvency."); see also Owen v. Cannon, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 
2015 WL 3819204, at *25 (Del. Ch. June 17, 2015) ("I find that it is appropriate under 
Golden Telecom to calculate the terminal growth rate as a premium to inflation."). The 
distinction does not alter the outcome in this case, and this decision expresses no view on 
the issue. 
• 442  
Marcus Opening Report ¶ 236. 
• 443  
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Dages Tr. 747; see also Pratt & Grabowski, supra, at 194 ("Many high-tech companies 
are good examples of stocks with high betas. . . . The classic example of a low-beta stock 
would be a utility that has not diversified into riskier activities."). 
• 444  
See, e.g., Dages Tr. 790-91 ("I don't see a basis for getting comfortable with a beta that is 
that low given this company, its position in the industry, and what I've heard about the 
challenges it's facing. Especially when I look at the peers and they are all up over 1. And 
I look at them, and they are well over 1 in a longer time period."). 
• 445  
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 118-19. See generally Dages Rebuttal Report ¶¶ 26-31 
(criticizing Marcus's beta). 
• 446  
See JX 802 at 25; JX 809 at 31. 
• 447  
Marcus Opening Report Ex. 3-1. 
• 448  
See JX 806 at 14 (final Barclays valuation); JX 811 at 19 (final Qatalyst valuation); JX 
812 at 14 (final Evercore valuation). 
• 449  
Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 7, 56. 
• 450  
See id. ¶¶ 89-96; Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 4; see also Dages Dep. 311 (describing the 
February projections with the two-year extension as the "best projections" for Aruba); 
accord Dages Tr. 733. 
• 451  
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 98-106 (describing the stock-based compensation figures 
he generated). 
• 452  
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See id. ¶ 115 (using tax rate of 30%). Dages stated in his report that "[t]he 30.0 percent 
tax rate is based on the effective tax rate used by Aruba in the Management Projections." 
Id. At trial, he admitted that this was an error. See Dages Tr. 732-33; 812-15. 
• 453  
Dages Tr. 802-05. 
• 454  
See Dages Opening Report ¶¶ 108-109. 
• 455  
See id. ¶ 110. Dages's report did not cite the financial economists or the opinion. 
Presumably, he was referring to the DFC trial-level opinion, where he also served as an 
expert. There, Chancellor Bouchard adopted the risk-free rate as a ceiling in reliance on 
Dages's identical suggestion "that some financial economists view the risk-free rate as the 
ceiling for a stable, long-term growth rate." DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 103, 2016 
WL 3753123, at *17. In that case, Dages had also acknowledged that "one suggested 
ceiling for a company's perpetuity growth rate is nominal GDP." 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
103, [WL] at *18; see also Golden Telecom Trial, 993 A.2d at 511 ("Generally, once an 
industry has matured, a company will grow at a steady rate that is roughly equal to the 
rate of nominal GDP growth."). Dages conceded that a 4.5% perpetuity growth rate, 
substantially above the 3.14% risk-free rate calculated in that case, was "at the high end 
of the reasonable range of long-term growth rates." DFC Trial, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
103, 2016 WL 3753123, at *18. On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court stated that the 
risk-free rate "is viewed to be the ceiling for a stable, long-term growth rate." DFC, 172 
A.3d at 383. The idea that a company in a steady state will grow more or less in line with 
the average rate of the broader economy has intuitive appeal. See 3M, 2013 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 172, 2013 WL 3793896, at *21 (quoting Golden Telecom for the proposition that 
"the rate of inflation is the floor for a terminal value" and noting that "a terminal growth 
rate should not be greater than the nominal growth rate for the United States economy"). 
Because the experts did not develop the issue further, and because resolving it is not 
necessary to decide this case, this decision expresses no opinion on the matter. 
• 456  
See Dages Opening Report ¶ 117. 
• 457  
See id. ¶ 124. 
• 458  
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See id. ¶¶ 118-122. 
• 459  
Id. Ex. 18. 
• 460  
Id. ¶ 127. 
• 461  
Dages Rebuttal Report ¶ 4. 
• 462  
See In re Orchard Enters., Inc., 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 165, 2012 WL 2923305, at *17 
(Del. Ch. July 18, 2012) (Strine, C.) (expressing the court's preference for "the more 
academically and empirically-driven CAPM model when that can be applied responsibly" 
and noting that it involves "less (but still more than comfortable) amounts of 
subjectivity"); Del. Open MRI, 898 A.2d at 338 (questioning the use of the build-up 
method with its concept of "company-specific risk" and observing "[t]he calculation of a 
company specific risk is highly subjective and often is justified as a way of taking into 
account competitive and other factors that endanger the subject company's ability to 
achieve its projected cash flows. In other words, it is often a back-door method of 
reducing estimated cash flows rather than adjusting them directly. To judges, the 
company specific risk premium often seems like the device experts employ to bring their 
final results into line with their clients' objectives, when other valuation inputs fail to do 
the trick."); Andaloro, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 2005 WL 2045640, at *12 n.49 
(criticizing expert who "spiraled" into a terminal growth rate "through an 
incomprehensible 'iterative process'" and finding that "[r]ather than a reasoned exercise in 
applied social science, [the expert] appears to have channeled inspiration, more like a 
great songwriter than a valuation expert"). 
• 463  
Dages Tr. 760-61 ("Q. So to be clear, your opinion, when you originally opined, was the 
February revenue projections; right? A. Correct."); id. at 767 ("Q. So you didn't just swap 
out the Dell'Oro projected growth rates for the industry for management's. You created 
your own industry projections. A. Correct."); id. at 772 ("Q. Now, in fact, you don't have 
any expertise that would allow you to determine whether Dell'Oro's industrywide growth 
rates are a reasonable proxy for Aruba's expected future performance, do you? A. No. No 
independent expertise, no."). 
• 464  
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Dages Tr. 751, 813. In light of other evidence in the record, the cash tax rate is more 
persuasive. See Galvin Dep. 296 (stating that management provided the cash tax rate); JX 
548 (Qatalyst spreadsheet showing management's cash tax rates); JX 654 (Qatalyst 
projections using management's cash tax rate); see also Dages Tr. 815 (testifying that 
cash tax rate is typically more accurate than effective tax rate). 
• 465  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 388. 
• 466  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 370; accord Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17 
(explaining that, when a market is efficient, "a company's stock price reflects the 
judgments of many stockholders about the company's future prospects, based on public 
filings, industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts. In these 
circumstances, a mass of investors quickly digests all publicly available information 
about a company, and in trading the company's stock, recalibrates its price to reflect the 
market's adjusted, consensus valuation of the company" (internal quotation marks and 
footnotes omitted)). 
• 467  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70; see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at 
*17 ("[T]he price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment 
of fair value than the view of a single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her 
valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled client."). 
• 468  
Applebaum, 812 A.2d at 890 (Del. 2002); see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 
6375829, at *15 n.108 (citing Applebaum); DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 & n.116 (quoting 
Applebaum). 
• 469  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 367. 
• 470  
Id. at 373. 
• 471  
Id. at 368-69 (footnote omitted). 
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• 472  
Id. at 364. 
• 473  
Id. at 367; see also Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *16 ("In fact, the 
record as distilled by the trial court suggests that the deal price deserved heavy, if not 
dispositive, weight."). 
• 474  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *21. 
• 475  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *13; DFC, 172 A.3d at 371. 
• 476  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26. 
• 477  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369 n.118. 
• 478  
Id. 
• 479  
Id. at 370. 
• 480  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26. 
• 481  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 362; cf. Lender Processing, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 189, 2016 WL 
7324170, at *33 ("The proximity between [the discounted cash flow] outcome and the 
result of the sale process is comforting."); Ancestry.com, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 21, 2015 
WL 399726, at *23 ("The DCF valuation I have described is close to the market, and 
gives me comfort that no undetected factor skewed the sales process."). 
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• 482  
Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-33 (quoting Technicolor I, 542 A.2d at 1187). 
• 483  
Technicolor II, 684 A.2d at 298. 
• 484  
Union Ill., 847 A.2d at 358. 
• 485  
Id. 
• 486  
See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 
Va. L. Rev. 549, 581 (1984). Behavioral economics, noise theory, and chaos theory may 
provide reasons to question this assumption, but for the reasons already stated, I do not 
believe that a trial court has the flexibility to disregard the Delaware Supreme Court's 
framing of the efficient capital markets hypothesis. 
• 487  
Cf. Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *26; DFC, 172 A.3d at 388. 
• 488  
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1038, 1049. 
• 489  
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1023-24, 1038, 1046-54, 1067; Implicit Minority 
Discount, supra, at 30-36, 52; Fair Value of Cornfields, supra, at 139-41. 
• 490  
See Control Premiums, supra, at 866-71; Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1052-53; 
Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 35, 52. 
• 491  
8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
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• 492  
See Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1055 (explaining that, for an acquisition of a 
widely held firm, "the firm's going concern value can be estimated . . . as the actual 
purchase price minus synergies minus control value"). Failing to make this adjustment 
would treat the value of the firm as greater than the aggregated value of individual shares, 
which is the same analytical misstep reflected in the concept of the implicit minority 
discount. See Control Premiums, supra, 854-59 (explaining conflict between efficient 
capital markets hypothesis and implicit minority discount); Implicit Minority Discount, 
supra, 53 (explaining logical equivalence between correcting for a non-existent implicit 
minority discount and introducing a "'third-party sale value lite' standard in lieu of the 
traditional 'proportionate share of going concern value' standard"). 
• 493  
See Control Premiums, supra, at 858-59 ("The basic conclusion of the Efficient Capital 
Markets Hypothesis (ECMH) is that market values of companies' shares traded in 
competitive and open markets are unbiased estimates of the value of the equity of such 
firms."); Implicit Minority Discount, supra, at 52 ("Take the case of a publicly traded 
company that has no controller. Efficient market theory states that the shares of this 
company trade at the pro rata value of the corporation as a going concern."); id. at 60 
("As a matter of generally accepted financial theory . . . , share prices in liquid and 
informed markets do generally represent that going concern value . . . ."); see also 
Rationalizing Appraisal, supra, at 1033-34. 
• 494  
DFC, 172 A.3d at 369-70. 
• 495  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *17 
• 496  
Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., 1993 Del. Ch. LEXIS 91, 1993 WL 208763, at *8 (Del. 
Ch. June 8, 1993) (citing In re Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992)); accord Del. 
Open MRI Radiology Assocs. P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 310-11 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
See generally Appraisal Rights, supra, at A-89 to A-90 ("If both parties fail to meet the 
preponderance standard on the ultimate question of fair value, the Court is required under 
the statute to make its own determination."). 
• 497  
8 Del. C. § 262(h). 
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• 498  
Dell, 2017 Del. LEXIS 518, 2017 WL 6375829, at *13 ("In reality, the burden falls on 
the trial judge to determine fair value, using all relevant factors." (internal quotation 
marks and alterations omitted)). 
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